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Figure 1 Map of First Czechoslovak Republic1

Introduction

The disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 created a hotbed of struggle in
Central and Eastern Europe. New nation-states were formed that had never existed before,
encompassing a multitude of different faiths, language groups, and cultures. The First
Czechoslovak Republic was one of these multi-national states that emerged after World War I.
The new republic, created in 1918, was officially approved at the Paris Peace Conference the
following year. Czechoslovakia was comprised of the Czech Crownlands (Bohemia, Moravia,
and Silesia), along with Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Upper Hungary (renamed Slovakia). The
geographic placement and unique makeup of the population made Czechoslovakia a bridge
between Eastern and Western Europe.

1

Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža, eds., A History of the Czechoslovak Republic (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1973), 116.
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This thesis will analyze minority nation-building and identity in the First Czechoslovak
Republic and the struggles the minority populations faced when they came under Czech control.
Each new state created after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had to cope with a
monarchical and imperial past, one in which they had been ruled without a common ancestry or
history. As the First Czechoslovak Republic attempted to forge a new independent democratic
identity, the state had to contend with the same problem the Empire had: how to govern disparate
cultures and peoples. It is important to investigate these different peoples, where they lived in
relation to the empire and then in relation to the Czechoslovak borderlands. Consideration must
also be given to the importance of language in nation-building and how it ties into the
nationalism of these particular nation groups. Each minority group had their own form of
nationalism and sense of community due to their language and geographic location.
The tensions between the Czech majority and the Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ukrainian,
and Jewish minorities greatly affected the development of the new republic. On the part of the
Slovak population, there were problems surrounding the idea of national self-determination and
their unease over being combined with the Czechs to create a majority. The German minority
oftentimes saw the Czech majority as vengeful for their treatment under the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy. The Hungarian minority felt similarly to the Germans in regard to their Slovak
counterparts, as they had enjoyed elevated status under the Hungarian branch of the Dual
Monarchy, but found themselves excluded from building the new nation. The Jewish minority
was supported by the founders of the Republic, but anti-Semitic beliefs from the German
population specifically contributed to their own issues with nation-building. When examining the
different political, social, and economic difficulties for each of the major minorities within the
First Republic against the global rhetoric being pushed by the Czechoslovak government, it is
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easy to see that the government cared less about certain minorities than it did about its
reputation. There were several instances that will be examined further in which the First
Republic’s government set out to humiliate certain groups for past treatment and made subtle
attempts at homogenization towards others. The Czechs in the First Republic were determined to
present themselves as a bastion of democracy to the West, but they also set out to get even for
past imperial wrongdoings committed by those they were now in charge of.
A brief history of this area is needed to understand the complicated relationships between
the different nationalities that made up the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Czech Lands of
Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia made up one of the oldest kingdoms in Europe and the Czech
people were independent until the Thirty Years’ War. A very recent publication on the entirety of
Czech history, A History of the Czech Lands by Jaroslav Pánek, Oldřich Tůma, et al., covers
everything from original settlement to 2004. The introduction points out that “when the
European past is narrated, a small number of states dominate…while the others are either
occasionally remarked upon or completely overlooked.”2 Scholars often overlook the Czech
Lands (along with the various peoples who live there). According to Pánek and Tůma, the
“Czech state, its core and borders, were formed from the beginning of the 10th to the beginning
of the 11th centuries.”3 During the Přemyslid Dynasty (beginning of the 11th century and ending
in 1306)4 the political center of this area became Bohemia, and it was on this Dynasty that Czech
leader Thomas Masaryk based his idea to take back the Czech lands in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.

2

Jaroslav Pánek, et al., A History of the Czech Lands, second edition, translated by Justin Quinn, Petra Key, and Lea
Bennis (Prague: Charles University – Karolinum Press, 2018), 17.
3
Ibid., 26.
4
Ibid., 27-28.
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Figure 2 Thomas G. Masaryk5

The aforementioned awakening began in the late eighteenth century on the back of the
French Revolution and is crucial to how the founders of Czechoslovakia convinced an
international council in the twentieth century to create a state named after the combination of two
Slavic peoples. Masaryk credits the beginning of the Czech national revival with Jan Kollár
(1793-1852), a Slovak Protestant who wrote Slávy dcera (Slava’s Daughter), “combining the
themes of love and Pan-Slavism.”6 Masaryk explained in The Meaning of Czech History that the
main purpose of the renaissance was to “create and nurture an independent, indigenous Czech
culture, and to perfect the Czech language through many-sided literary activity.”7 However, this
renaissance was also a way to counter the Germanization the Czech people endured under

5

Ian Willoughby, “Giant of Czech history T.G. Masaryk born on this day in 1850,” Radio Prague
International, March 7, 2020, accessed January 20, 2022, https://english.radio.cz/giant-czech-history-tgmasaryk-born-day-1850-8106276.
6
Thomas G. Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History, edited by René Wellek, translated by Peter Kussi (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), 156.
7
Ibid., 16.
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Austrian rule. Masaryk states here that the rural population was able to retain their mother
tongue, but that the “intelligentsia…in the schools, the language of instruction was Latin,
replaced by German in the eighteenth century;” therefore, the Czech elite were educated in
German instead of their own language. Masaryk also gives some credit to the rural Czech
population for keeping the national consciousness alive.8
The layout of this thesis is as follows: the first two chapters explore the Slovak and the
German minorities, while the third will focus on three smaller minorities: the Hungarians, the
Ukrainians, and the Jews. The population of Czechoslovakia consisted of Czechs and Slovaks,
Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Roma, Russians, and Jews. When Czechoslovakia was
created, it was the combination of the Czechs and Slovaks that lent their names. The largest two
national populations were the Czechs and Germans. The demographic makeup consisted of fifty
percent Czech, fourteen percent Slovak, twenty-three percent German, and the other populations
making up thirteen percent total.9 The determining factor in figuring out which national group a
person belonged to was spoken language. According to René Petráš, the First Czechoslovak
Republic “had one of the most thorough legal regulations of the minority status,” which was a
direct result of using language to determine nationality. The administrative language of the
Republic was Czechoslovak and those who did not speak or read either were left at a
disadvantage. He then goes on to call the extensive regulation “rather overcomplicated,” which is
not an overstatement.10
One of the key features of forming and governing the First Republic was the idea of
Czechoslovakism. This ideology essentially meant that the Slovaks were Czechs, “only less

8

Ibid., 17.
Andrej Tóth and Lukás Novotny, “On Some Aspects of Political and Legal Background of National Minorities in
Czechoslovakia (1918-1938),” Zgodovinski Casopis no. ½ (2014): 217.
10
René Petráš, “Definition of Minorities in Czechoslovakia,” Europa Ethnica 74, no. ½ (2017): 17.
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developed,” a sentiment that was prominent among Czech circles. According to Elisabeth Bakke,
“the national minorities were explicitly excluded from the Czechoslovak nation, as well as from
any state-forming status.” Despite the fact that they were included in the national majority, the
Slovak elite opposed being a part of Czechoslovakism as they believed themselves separate from
the Czechs.11 As time progressed, this rhetoric became more pronounced. Bakke states that the
trajectory of the rhetoric can be found in the Constitution as well as speeches in the Parliament.12
The combination of the two peoples into one representative group also meant that the Slovaks
now had more representative power than the Germans and this was done intentionally by the
founders and the representatives at the Paris Peace Conference so that the Germans would be
more limited.13 However, this was not solely beneficial to the Czechs because “the Slovak
national leaders preferred a Czechoslovak state to the alternative, which was to remain under
Hungarian rule.”14
Wilsonian national self-determination was another factor in forming the Czechoslovak
state. Self-determination meant that certain kinds of nations deserved to be their own states and
determine15 Modernity (both politically and economically) was an important part of Woodrow
Wilson’s particular version of self-determination.16 Specifically, modernity meant an emphasis
on industrial labor and that the new nation-states’ economic policies aligned with those of the
West. Michael Cude explains that the “Czechs’ historical claims to independence, modern
economy, and proactivity in the Austrian Parliament clearly met the standards of national
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Elisabeth Bakke, “The Making of Czechoslovakism in the First Czechoslovak Republic,” in Loyaltäten in der
Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918-1938 (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004): 21.
12
Ibid., 25.
13
A further explanation of the Paris Peace Conference and those involved in setting the borders for the New Europe,
and subsequently, the New Republic will be in a subsequent chapter.
14
Bakke, “The Making of Czechoslovakism,” 25.
15
Brad Simpson, “The Many Meanings of National Self-Determination,” Current History (Nov 2014): 312-313.
16
Michael R. Cude, “Wilsonian National Self-Determination and the Slovak Question During the Founding of
Czechoslovakia, 1918-1921,” Diplomatic History 40, no. 1 (2016): 157.
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development set by Wilson.” He then goes on to say that it was specifically the Czech argument
of having previously run their own kingdom that tipped them over the edge in the views of
Washington, DC. 17 In the views of Wilson, the Czechs met the criterion needed to become
independent, whereas the Slovaks did not. The Slovaks did not have a history of independence
like the Czechs; the Slovak territory was called Upper Hungary until the collapse of the empire.
Another thing in favor of the Czechs was their industrialization. The Slovaks came from a much
more agricultural background.18 It is worth noting that some Czechs and Slovaks in the United
States looked to the US government to support a Czechoslovak independent state. The United
States itself was still a young government, especially in international politics, so it is significant
that these people would look to them for approval. The leaders of the First Republic also wanted
to impress the American president. Wilson’s words inspired nations all over Europe during the
years leading up to the end of the war; many people cited Wilson in their attempts to build their
own states.
Here, it is important to take into consideration what determines a nation. Benedict
Anderson gives an excellent look into the rise of nationalism and how a nation is defined in his
book Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. He links the
development of nationalism to the growing availability of literature in vernacular languages
instead of languages of the state.19 He states specifically that “the most important thing about
language is its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect particular
solidarities.”20 The administrative language of the nation was Czechoslovak, a combination of

17

Ibid., 160.
Emanuel Čapek, “The Background of Political Parties in Czechoslovakia,” The Slavonic and East European
Review 10, no. 28 (1931): 93.
19
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, UK:
Verso, 2016), 75.
20
Ibid., 133.
18
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the Czech and Slovak languages. Slovak was not a written language until the eighteenth century,
and while both languages are linguistically similar, one can discern the discrepancy between a
country built for all that is being administered with one state language. Another important aspect
of Anderson’s book is his explanation of how a group of people who speak the same language
feel they are connected, even if a nation for those people did not exist. The Czechs built an
imagined community before the creation of the First Republic because they spoke the same
language and had the same cultural traditions. This sense of a nation that exists but does not exist
(an Imagined Community) is a driving force behind each of the nationalities that lived within the
First Republic.
The majority of primary sources in this analysis come from The New York Times and the
Jewish Daily Bulletin, as well as academic journals of the time such as the Slavonic and East
European Review and the Slavonic Review. The former two provided excellent English sources
as to how the West perceived what was happening in the First Republic, while the latter two
provided either English translations or information originally written in English by those
studying the area or those who lived in central-eastern Europe at the time. Works by RW SetonWatson were invaluable when researching those officials in the government of the First Republic
who were important to the state’s development, but for some reason did not warrant translations
of their works. Many works by the founders of the First Czechoslovak Republic have been
translated to English, such as The Meaning of Czech History by Thomas Masaryk and Bohemia’s
Case for Independence by Eduard Beneš (the first two presidents of the Republic)21. These
works offer much understanding of Czech sentiment in regard to who they were as a nation and

21

Eduard Beneš, Bohemia’s Case for Independence, (1917; repr., Good Press, 2020)., Thomas G. Masaryk, The
Meaning of Czech History, edited by René Wellek, translated by Peter Kussi (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974).
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what they hoped to achieve. There are no primary sources from the minorities in this thesis
because they are unavailable in English. This draws attention to a lack of English sources on this
subject and the broader subject of the history of Eastern Europe.
Until recently, there was a dearth of academic scholarship on the First Czechoslovak
Republic. Indeed, there is still less on the minorities than there is concerning the entirety of the
history of the nation. Within the last couple of years, there have been some publications on fairly
niche topics, such as Scholars in Exile: The Ukrainian Intellectual World in Interwar
Czechoslovakia by Nadia Zavorotna and Zionists in Interwar Czechoslovakia: Minority
Nationalism and the Politics of Belonging by Tatjana Lichtenstein.22 There have also been
several recent scholarly works on Milan Rastislav Štefánik, one of the men who fought for the
Republic to be built. One crucial work to this study of the German minority are Czechs and
Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia by
Elizabeth Wiskemann.23 This monograph provided excellent insight into the deep-rooted history
between the Czechs and Germans. A brief look through the bibliography will show that many of
the secondary sources are more than twenty years old. While this is not ideal for a modern study
of the First Czechoslovak Republic, it does offer insight into the lack of attention this small
nation has received. However, even with the lack of sources within the last two decades, what
has been produced since the First Republic’s inception still provided enough information to
understand the very tangled history of minorities within Czechoslovakia.

22

Tatjana Lichtenstein, Zionists in Interwar Czechoslovakia: Minority Nationalism and the Politics of Belonging
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016)., Nadia Zavarotna, Scholars in Exile: The Ukrainian Intellectual
World in Interwar Czechoslovakia (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2020).
23
Jozef Banáš Milan Rastislav Štefánik: A Man of Iron Will (IKAR 2019). Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and
Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (London: Oxford University
Press, 1938).
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Each of the minority nationalities within the First Republic were unique in their own
ways and thus handled by the new government in different ways; the Slovaks were unique to the
First Republic because they were part of the national majority, yet many felt they were treated as
a minority because the Czechs were highly favored within the government. Chapter One will
explore the Slovaks and their attempts at their own self-determination outside the Czech
government. It will begin with an examination of the lingering effects of the Austro-Hungarian
Dual Monarchy on the Czech-Slovak relationship, in areas such as differences in religious beliefs
and economic development. It will also discuss the various positive developments the Slovaks
experienced during the First Republic, when the literacy rate of the Slovaks rose and they began
producing literature in their own language, which had been impossible for them to do under the
previous regime.
Chapter Two will deal with the German population within the First Republic, and in
particular, the population in the Sudetenland and its relationship to Germany. The German
minority is highly important for an analysis of the different nationalities in this nation because
they constituted the second-highest population after the Czechoslovaks. Like the Slovaks, the
Germans and Czechs had an interwoven history dating back centuries before Czechoslovakia.
Many of the German issues lay in them losing their favoritism from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and being thrust into a minority position within the new Republic. Beginning with the
years leading up to the First World War, and ending with the rise of Nazism in the Sudetenland,
this chapter will explore the decline of socioeconomic statuses of German citizens, issues with
Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy, as well as problems with language regulation.
Chapter Three will cover three of the smaller minorities within Czechoslovakia: the
Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Jewish populations. It will begin with the Hungarian population
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because they faced more issues with the Slovaks in the First Republic than with the Czechs. This
section will analyze the social decline of the Hungarians through the lens of education, religion,
and the foreign relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Hungarians faced a similar
issue to the Germans because they were favored under the Hungarian monarchy before the
collapse and felt as though they were forced into a minority status when the lines of the new
Europe were drawn. The section on the Ukrainian population will offer a juxtaposition to the
Hungarian minority because, as it explores the educational and governmental policies relating to
the Ukrainians, and foreign relations of Czechoslovakia and Soviet Ukraine, it will become clear
that the Czechoslovak government did not treat all populations as equal. This section will also
explore Ukrainian views on national self-determination and how the Czechoslovak government
supported their bid for it, while attempting to use that same philosophy against its other
minorities. The Ukrainians were unique in that the government of the Republic, especially
President Thomas Masaryk, were supportive of Ukrainian intellectuals, and even supported
building Ukrainian universities so that the intelligentsia could study and produce art and literary
works in their own language. Finally, the last section of the chapter will explore the Jewish
population and their relationship with both the Czechoslovak government and the German
population within the Republic. The Jewish population is important because they were able to
pick their nationality based on their religion, not their mother tongue. They were also supported
by the Czechoslovak government, but the Germans within the Sudetenland fought against the
rights of the Jewish citizens. The chapter will end with the rise of anti-Semitic rhetoric within the
wave of Nazism that seeped into the corners of the Republic in the 1930s.

12

Chapter 1: The Slovaks
“Every Slovak was a Czech…and every Czech was a Slovak…”24

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Slovak reaction to their unusual position of
both majority and minority population within the First Czechoslovak Republic. They were a
minority because they represented only 14.5% of the overall population. However, when
combined with the Czechs to form one nationality, they became part of the majority and
represented 65.5% of the population.25 The Slovak Question, much like other minority questions,
was at the forefront of Czech-Slovak relations. At the outset of the Republic, the Slovaks
welcomed a union with the Czechs, as many saw it as their only opportunity to build up their
newly independent nation. Prominent Slovak leaders fully supported the creation of the
Republic, mostly on the grounds that they would have much more freedom than they had during
Austro-Hungarian rule. Outside forces like Hungary, as well as religious and representative
difficulties, contributed to the tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks. There were also
prominent Slovak leaders who resisted Czech rule. The chapter will also explore various
apprehensions faced by both the Czechoslovak government and the Czech people in regard to
how the Hungarian government conducted itself toward the new Republic. The Hungarian
government sought to take back Slovakia since it had been part of the Hungarian branch of the
Dual Monarchy and the government of the new Republic sought to protect that land. Each of the
issues faced by these peoples were interwoven; none happened in a vacuum and there was not a

24

Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža, eds., A History of the Czechoslovak Republic (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1973), 30-31.
25
Jan Kuklík and René Petráš, eds., Minorities and Law in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992 (Prague: Karolinum Press,
2017), 70.

13

single issue that did not spill over into another part of life. Overall, combining these nationalities
into one state turned out to be full of problems that were never truly resolved in the twenty-year
life of the First Republic. The issues between the Hungarians and the Czechs also impacted the
Czech-Slovak relationship, which is the reason for their inclusion in this chapter. The Hungarian
minority had their own issues with the Czech government that affected their relations with each
other, while the problems with the Hungarian government affected the Slovak population in the
First Republic, thus the need for this chapter on the Slovak population and the section in Chapter
Three concerning the Hungarian minority.
The Czechs and Slovaks had a long history, since they were similar ethnic groups and
had lived in the same part of Central-Eastern Europe for centuries. Even with their shared history
and experience of colonization by foreign kingdoms, the two groups had vastly different
experiences while under the Austro-Hungarian regime. The Slovaks had been under the control
of the Hungarian branch of the Dual Monarchy for a thousand years, while the Czechs had only
been taken over by Austria toward the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War (about three hundred
years prior). The Slovaks were forced to undergo Magyarization, while the Czechs maintained
their culture and even had representatives such as T.G. Masaryk in the Austrian government.26
Eduard Beneš understood and wrote extensively on the relationship between the two nations in
his book Bohemia’s Case for Independence. He explains that until about the “middle of the
nineteenth century, the ties which held them together were very close, and some of the most
illustrious pioneers of the Czech renaissance were Slovaks.”27 The significance of the Czechs

26

In regard to Magyarization, the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary attempted to bring all of its subjects under one
nation group. Here, it tried to force the Slovaks to assimilate to a Hungarian lifestyle, which entailed losing their
language and having their history suppressed in favor of becoming Magyars. This forced assimilation was called
Magyarization because ethnic Hungarians are Magyars. Magyarization will come into play in Chapter 3 as well.
27
Eduard Beneš, Bohemia’s Case for Independence (1917; repr., Good Press, 2020), 8.
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and Slovaks not being tied together as closely after the middle of the nineteenth century is due to
the fact that in 1868, a new language law was passed in Hungary, making Magyar the official
language of the nation and thus denying the Slovaks their language. When this happened, “nonMagyar nations living in the land were cruelly persecuted…[with] imprisonment [and]flogging,”
thus ushering in the age of Magyarization in Hungary.28 At this point, the Czechs were under
Austrian control, so the Magyarization policy only affected the Slovaks.
Masaryk refers to the previously mentioned renaissance as “the renaissance of the
Czecho-Slovak nation” and is “proof of strong national vitality.”29 Masaryk explains that it made
sense for the Czechs and Slovaks to become a combined nation, even though their populations
did not compare to those of the bigger world powers. He states that “the present-day great
nations have laid the foundation of their culture at a time when they were smaller or as small”
and that it is “especially significant that in the former days there did not exist the modern
methods of communication [and] industry…which are said to be necessary for the development
of the up-to-date culture.”30 The Czech nation was in a good position to claim modernity (in the
eyes of the West because even though they had experienced certain limitations under the
Austrian regime, they still “had achieved a respectable level of development” in areas such as
economic development and industrial skills.31 Under Magyarization, the Slovaks faced much
more stunted growth: the literacy rate was low, and most income came from agriculture or other
hard labor.

28

Josef Pešek, The Story of Czechoslovakia, translated by Marie J. Kohnová (Praha: Professors’ Printing House and
Library, 1930), 182.
29
Thomas Masaryk, The New Europe. (The Slav standpoint.), translated by Nová Evropa (London: Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1918), 24.
30
Ibid., 24.
31
Josef Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 86-87.
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Modernity, or lack thereof in the Slovak case, fed directly into one important aspect of
the formation of the Czechoslovak state: the concept of national self-determination. This
terminology was coined by US President Woodrow Wilson toward the end of World War I to
explain that nations deserve to be their own states with the ability to determine their own
destinies. Of course, the concept of self-determination was around well before it was put so
concisely.32 The use of self-determination ideology exploded all over Europe toward the end of
the war, as the Habsburg monarchy dissolved and people moved to create their own nations
under their own influences, which was the result of decades of nationalist movements within the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Czechoslovakia was one of those nations. A particularly important
aspect of Wilsonian national self-determination was the need for modernity (both politically and
economically) and a background of independence for the people.33 Here, the Czechs had the
advantage, as the Czech Lands had lost their independence about three hundred years before and
were viewed by the US as a state-turned vassal of the Habsburg Empire, capable of building their
own nation. While American support was helpful to the fledging state, they also needed British
and French support.
One of the most important British delegates to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference was
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. According to Margaret MacMillan, Lloyd George
was the youngest of the big three (Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Wilson) and had
known “personal scandals and political controversies [that] had threatened to ruin his career.”34
MacMillan also credits Lloyd George with holding his country together and leading them to

32

Brad Simpson, “The Many Meanings of National Self-Determination,” Current History (Nov 2014): 312-313.
Michael R. Cude, “Wilsonian National Self-Determination and the Slovak Question During the Founding of the
Czechoslovakia, 1918-1921,” Diplomatic History 40, no 1 (2016): 157.
34
Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House Trade
Paperbacks, 2001), location 937, Kindle.
33
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victory during the war, and even though he faced controversy within his cabinet and there was
much unrest in Britain during this time, Lloyd George still “entered into the negotiations in Paris
as though he had little else on his mind.”35 The head of the French delegation, Georges
Clemenceau, brought “France's profound patriotism, its relief at the victory and its perpetual
apprehension of a revived Germany” to the Conference.36 From Wilson came “the United States’
benevolence, a confident assurance that the American way was the best, and an uneasy suspicion
that the Europeans might fail to see this.”37 Indeed, before Wilson arrived, the Europeans were
arguing amongst themselves regarding the different demands from each corner of the continent,
but the meetings ended up “fail[ing] to produce a common European approach.”38 The
representatives from Central and Eastern Europe witnessed these failed negotiations and thus
looked to the US president for new ideas on nation-building.

35

Ibid., 954.
Ibid., 920.
37
Ibid., 920.
38
Ibid., 920.
36
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Figure 3 Wilson-Lloyd George Exchange, Left to right: David Lloyd George, Georges
Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson at Paris Peace Conference, 191939

The Slovaks, however, were not ready for statehood in the eyes of the big western powers
based on a few factors, including the national focus on agricultural labor and their association
with the Hungarian branch of Austria-Hungary. Emanuel Čapek stated in an article in 1931 that
“out of every hundred people in Slovakia, sixty-seven [then lived] by agricultural labor, while
only seventeen [were] engaged in industry and hardly eight in business and transport.”40 This led
to a western perception of the Slovak people as less modern than the Czechs, who were seen as
more focused on industry, which in turn made them more appealing to the Western European
nations. A major issue with Wilson’s version of national self-determination stemmed from the
fact that he would not support the creation of a state if that state did not have a prior background
of independence. This put the Slovaks at a disadvantage because they did not have such a

39

“Wilson-Lloyd George Exchange,” Columbia University, accessed January 20, 2022,
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/history/winter/w3206/edit/wilsongeorgeexc.html,
40

Emanuel Čapek, “The Background of Political Parties in Czechoslovakia,” The Slavonic and East European
Review 10, no 28 (1931): 93.
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history; they had been under Hungarian rule for most of their past (it was called Upper Hungary
until the collapse of the empire). There were several reasons as to why Wilson supported the
making of Czechoslovakia and the combining of the two peoples: lobbying by Czech and Slovak
immigrants in the United States to convince the president of the Czechoslovak readiness for selfgovernment; the service Czech and Slovak legionnaires convincing the US that they were doing
their part in the war effort; and effective propaganda from exiled Czech and Slovak leaders using
excellent propaganda to show just how modern these people were.41
A driving force of the rhetoric surrounding national self-determination was the idea of
“civic” nationalism, which focused less on national lineage and more on common experiences
between people.42 This focus shifted from the traditional nationalism that had developed in
Europe at this time and was particularly present in the First Republic because of the many
different nationalities within the borders. During the negotiations for the Republic, the Czechs
and Slovaks based their need for national self-determination on the experiences shared by them
under Austria-Hungary; later in the first iteration of Czechoslovakia, many of the minorities felt
they deserved to determine their own destinies based on their shared national lineage (an
example would be the Sudeten Germans). Most of the founders of the Republic were focused on
modernity and looked to the West as models; therefore, it is unsurprising that self-determination
went hand-in-hand with the making of the Czechoslovak people. While on the surface this idea
sounded inclusive, underneath it was not. The concept, to the government, really only applied to
the Czechoslovak people, while other minorities were left out.43 The constitution was in theory
written to protect everyone under the law no matter their nationality; however, the Czechs were
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favored above all other nationalities and none of these others mentioned by name within the
Constitution. This favoritism, as will be explained, caused a rift between the two nationalities.
At the end of the War, the Czechs were a much more industrialized people than the rural
and agricultural Slovaks. This meant the Slovaks were seen as backwards and underdeveloped in
the modern world. As noted above, the Czechs and Slovaks had a long history with one another,
as they were (and still are to this day) ethnically and linguistically similar. Josef Korbel asserted
that the concept of Czechoslovakism was present long before the war, as evidenced by the fact
that a chair of Czechoslovak language was developed in Bratislava in 1903, and credits this as
the root of Czechoslovakism in Slovakia. The development of this chair in Bratislava (the capital
of Slovakia), shows that, initially, the Slovaks saw something beneficial in forming a new nation
with Czechs. By 1921, however, the Slovaks were growing afraid of being swallowed up by the
Czechs; this was likely because the first census was performed that year and they had a more indepth understanding of the population numbers.44 Since governmental representation was based
proportionately on population, the Slovaks had a smaller number of representatives in
Parliament. How did the Slovak leaders go from supporting the idea to resisting it in such a short
amount of time?
While the Czechs were well-intentioned in their plans to help the Slovak people
modernize, in their attempts they eclipsed the Slovaks and took over their lands. They swarmed
the Slovak lands and stayed there, effectively changing the demographics. This led to a change in
the treatment of the Slovaks as well. There was an influx of Slovak emigrants (170,000) to the
United States between 1922 and 1930 because there were no industry jobs available and the land
distributed among the people during the land reform, which began in 1923 and lasted until 1938,
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was often not arable.45 The mountainous and forested topography of Slovakia proved
problematic to the redistribution of land because “only two-fifths of Slovakia’s area were
cultivable.”46 During the land redistribution, “700,000 hectares of land were distributed among
200,000 families, but the average acreage of arable land was still below subsistence level.” When
it was time to build up Slovakia, Czechs flooded in, “eager to help [and] offer[ing] their skillful
hands and trained minds,” which limited the amount of industry jobs that Slovaks sought once
the depression hit.47
Czechoslovakism, as a concept, meant that the Czechs and Slovaks were one people.
Linguistically and ethnically, the two were (and are) very similar. Elizabeth Bakke argues that
there was also a second meaning: that the Slovaks were Czechs.48 Czechs were not the only
advocates for this concept, as there were several Slovak leaders who favored it. One particular
advocate was Vavro Šrobár, a Slovak leader who looked at the Czechs with admiration for their
Western ideals. He “hoped that [Czechoslovakism] might permeate and transform the
amorphous, backward culture of Slovakia.”49 He signed the Czechoslovak Declaration of
Independence50 and was appointed to the first government as a Slovakian minister. In 1918, he
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was sent to Slovakia with a four-person Slovak government, money, and seventy gendarmes to
bring Slovakia under the Czechoslovakian government, because there was still conflict with
Hungary, that did not want to give up those lands. A couple of weeks after this occupation began,
the Hungarian government sent troops into Slovakia to reassert its authority.51
Milan Rastislav Štefánik, another Slovak advocate for Czechoslovakism, stated that
“every Slovak was a Czech living in Slovakia and every Czech was a Slovak living in the Czech
lands.”52 Štefánik, part of what Josef Korbel called an “extraordinary trio”, went to France to
study astronomy before the War, where he became a French citizen and excelled both in his field
and socially. He “opened the doors of political and intellectual salons [in Paris] to [Eduard]
Beneš and Masaryk.”53 During the War, Štefánik was deemed a traitor to his homeland, since he
was technically from Hungary (part of the Central Powers) and he was outfitted as Chevalier of
la Légion d’Honneur in the French Army (part of the Allies) the day that Germany declared war
on Russia. During this meeting, Štefánik received this French honor that he announced that the
Czechoslovaks did not want “anything but to be a nation recognized and respected, like the
French.”54
Štefánik yearned to help the French cause during the War even though he could not join
the military in a combat capacity due to poor health. Even so, he was still able to contribute to
the war effort in a military capacity and in 1914 he and one Captain d’Aragon flew behind
enemy lines in a reconnaissance mission; the plane crashed but both men were able to escape
unscathed. Josef Banáš states that Štefánik “wanted to prove his skill and especially his courage
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in combat,” and even though he was not part of the main combat, he still wanted to help his
cause by contacting Slavic fighters at the front lines. He wanted to convince the Allied Powers
that the Slavic troops fighting for Austria-Hungary had very low morale because they felt as
though they were fighting their brothers. It was this kind of wartime contribution to
Czechoslovak independence that brought the Slovak Štefánik to the forefront of the creation of
the new nation and led to his appointment as Czechoslovakia’s first Minister of War.
Unfortunately, he never saw the nation he helped to build, as he died in a plane crash on May 4,
1919, as he headed back to his homeland for the first time since well before the War. Amidst the
postwar dismantling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he was a celebrated hero within the
Slovak lands and was later memorialized in Košice, one of the most populated cities in Slovakia,
in the form of a statue.
Another staunch supporter of Czechoslovakism (it is important to specify that he was not
a supporter until after the War) was Milan Hodža. Hodža fought for Slovak autonomy before the
war had even begun. He had
found his way into the audience chambers of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was
known for his dislike of Hungarians, and when his hopes for an improvement in the
Slovak plight dimmed, he wrote… ‘We know that the Slovak nation existed when this
Empire did not yet exist – and it will exist in the future, when this Empire has ceased to
exist.55
This little outburst, along with appeals to Slovak parents to send their children to Czech schools,
earned Hodža eighteen months in prison. Once the War ended, he represented Czechoslovakism
and became the leader of the Slovak branch of the Agrarian Party. According to Mikuláš Teich,
“Hodža was able to adapt his policies flexibly to suit specific situations,”56 and Korbel explains
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that eventually “his convictions about the unity of the Czechoslovak nation gave way…to a
pragmatic defense of the individuality of the Slovak nation.”57 Hodža was involved in several
different political schemes through the twenty-year life of the state, in what seemed to be an
effort to gain power, not to further his people or the Czechoslovaks as a whole.
Still, there were some Slovaks who had misgivings about Czechoslovakism because “it
mirrored the Magyar idea of a unitary Hungarian nation,” which had imposed a “brutal linguistic
and ethnic assimilation” policy.58 The Czechoslovak linguistic policy for the nation declared the
hybrid language Czechoslovak as the official state language. Teich argues that the creation of a
Czechoslovak language “directly affected the ethnic identity of the Slovak nation.”59 The
combination of the Czech and Slovak language is a complicated, if not confusing, topic. Both
languages are linguistically very similar, and Slovak had not been a written language for very
long by the time this policy came into being.
One Slovak who did not support the unity of the Czechs and Slovaks was Andrej Hlinka.
When the Czechoslovak Republic was formed, Hlinka stated, “the Slovaks would not ‘have seen
freedom if it were not for the Czechs,’”60 and he proclaimed that “the thousand-year marriage to
the Magyars has failed. We must divorce.”61 According to RW Seton-Watson, Hlinka originally
shared the “general view that the only hope for Slovakia lay in close union with the Czechs.”62
How did Father Andrej Hlinka go from being supportive of a Czech-Slovak union to being one
of its biggest detractors?
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Originally a member of the Slovak National Party at the beginning of the Republic,
Hlinka became the leader of the Slovak People’s Party (renamed Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party
in 1925). This party was the result of a split from the Slovak National Party.63 The split occurred
because “Hlinka and his followers were upset by the anticlerical character of the new
Czechoslovak regime” and felt as though this threatened the “traditional, conservative way of life
in Slovakia.”64 This threat to conservativism was especially felt when the Czechs moved into
Slovak lands at the beginning of the Republic to help them further develop. Traditionally, the
Slovaks were a conservative people, and this was thanks in part to the lack of education in
prewar Slovakia. Josef Korbel states that before the War “there were 276 schools for 30,000
children, with Slovak as the language of instruction…no secondary schools at all; and illiteracy
in the country was at 34.9%.” By 1930, illiteracy had been reduced to 8.16%.65
Hlinka’s mistrust toward the Czechs had to do, in part, with what some Slovaks saw as a
broken promise. This promise was the Pittsburgh Agreement, signed on May 30, 1918. The
Slovak People’s Party saw this document as a “binding promise by Masaryk that the Slovaks
would enjoy autonomy in a Czechoslovak state.”66 The problem was that the Pittsburgh
Agreement was signed by Czech- and Slovak-Americans, not by anyone who lived in the Czech
or Slovak lands. Initially, the Agreement smoothed tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks,
but that changed when the Czechoslovak government asserted that because the agreement was
signed in a foreign land, it could not be binding in Europe.
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What perhaps felt more personal to the Slovaks was when President Masaryk wrote to
Hlinka in 1929 that “it [the Pittsburgh Agreement] was invalid because one of the parties to it,
the Slovak League of America, had not yet had its charter recognized by the United States
government.”67 James Felak asserts that “the Pittsburgh Agreement served Masaryk’s needs of
the moment [and] with it, he could show Western leaders, in particular Woodrow Wilson, that
his attempts to create a Czechoslovak state had Slovak backing.”68 It was not clear if this
statement was made public, or if Hlinka shared it with the members of his Party to gain their
backing against Czechoslovakism. On November 11, 1918, the Czechoslovak government
recognized that all agreements that Masaryk concluded as head of the Czechoslovak wartime
independence movement were valid. In this instance, it is easy to understand why the Slovak
population grew restless for recognition.
Felak explains that it was never clear what Masaryk’s relationship to the agreement was,
because it was only said that the leaders of the three organizations that signed it (the Slovak
League of America, the Czech National Alliance, and the Federation of Czech Catholics)
“deliberated in the presence of” Masaryk.69 Masaryk signed the document, but it was never clear
if he was legally bound to it, hence the controversy surrounding it.70 Clearly, since discussions of
the agreement were still happening eleven years after it was signed, the Pittsburgh Agreement
became important in the Slovak movement for self-determination. Slovaks like Andrej Hlinka
used it to show that the Czechs did not have the best interest of the Slovaks in mind. To him, it
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proved that the Czechs wanted hegemony over the Slovaks, not a nation of equals, as they felt
the Czechs continually backtracked their promises when it suited them to do so.
In the mid-to-late 1930s, there was a movement to strengthen centralized government.
According to Teich, this triggered “radicalism and extra-parliamentary activities” by several of
Slovakia’s opposition parties. He explains that Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party joined with the
Slovak National Party in 1932 and adopted the Zvolen Manifesto, which “emphasized a united
and energetic effort to achieve the legislative autonomy of Slovakia on the basis of recognition
of the separate identity of the Slovak nation.”71 Therefore, in the span of about fifteen years, the
Slovaks went from nominally supporting Czechoslovakism to advocating for autonomy.
It is important to point out that Andrej Hlinka was a Catholic priest, so governmental
progressivism directly influenced him. He felt as though the centralized government was fighting
against religion, and in particular, Catholicism. Even though Czech lands and Slovakia were
overwhelmingly Catholic, the Czechs had a much more distant relationship with the religion than
their Slovak counterparts. With the dissolution of Hungary at the end of the War, the Slovak
Catholics found a new freedom. Previously, the monarchy utilized the Church as a means of
Magyarization and as such, no Slovaks could hold positions within the hierarchy. Now, they had
much more power. In 1933, Anton Kompánek wrote that the Catholics, particularly in Slovakia,
tended to “misrepresent the real position of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia and to arouse
the impression that Slovak Catholicism has reached a critical stage of decay” and the only
remedy to this was “the restoration of Slovakia to Hungary,” stirring up irredentist sentiments.72
This misrepresentation can be countered by the fact that the government of Czechoslovakia did
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not appoint any Catholic bishops in Slovakia; it was by a memorandum agreed upon by the
Czechoslovak government and the Vatican (known as the Modus Vivendi) that the Holy See
would be the only institution with the power to appoint bishops in all of Czechoslovakia.73
Even more radical than Andrej Hlinka was Professor Vojtech Tuka. Tuka was a former
university professor and editor of the daily publication Slovák with right-wing beliefs and
sympathy for Italian fascism. James Felak explains that Tuka drafted the Žilina Memorandum,
which “alleged Czech mistreatment of the Slovaks and demanded autonomy for Slovakia,” and
in 1923, he took the document to both the League of Nations in Geneva and the Council of
Ambassadors in Paris. Both institutions refused to meet with him.74 The document had phrases
that spoke to the so-called decline of the Slovak people, such as the Czechs leading “a real reign
of terror” and insisting how the Slovaks were “a nation of culture throttled.” The document also
falsely claimed that the “word Czechoslovak was invented in order to rob the Slovaks of their
position as a national minority” and that the schools in Slovakia were only used as a tool of
denationalization.75 Seton-Watson argues that the tone of the memorandum was “one of
sweeping generalization, which covers almost every subject, yet rarely condescends to concrete
facts.”76
With the desire to separate from the Czechs, Slovak Catholics turned their hostility
toward the Protestants, as they represented more progressive thought. Seton-Watson determined
that “their indignation against the methods of militant anti-clericalism [was] perfectly natural,
but to fall into similar extravagances of intolerance [would] only defeat their own aim.”77 Slovák
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was “the main organ of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party” and Tuka used its 1928 New Year’s
issue to refer to a secret “but really non-existent appendix to the Martin Declaration…[that]
asserted that the Slovaks agreed to be part of Czechoslovakia for a ‘probationary period’ of ten
years” and that by the end of October 1928, Slovakia would “cease to be part of
Czechoslovakia.”78 Tuka was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison on charges of treason
and spying for Hungary. Seton-Watson explained that Tuka’s “relations with Magyar circles
[could not] be denied, and he appear[ed] to have at least played with the idea of a federal union
with Poland and Hungary.”79
With this short analysis, one can understand that Tuka was completely against the
Czechoslovak government. In his tenth anniversary speech to the nation, Masaryk acknowledged
that there was a certain level of discontent within some circles. He went on to say that “there is
no agreement with those who on principle are opposed to the Republic and to democracy” and
appealed to the nation that they could “no longer allow [themselves] to be misled by the
wrapping up of incapacity in bombastic watchwords concerning nationalism, morality and
religion, progress and the revolutionary spirit.”80 Even though he did not mention names in his
address, one can surmise that he was speaking about people who thought and behaved like Tuka
and wanted them to know that he was aware of their resistance.
Economic development in the new nation also served as a point of tension between the
Czechs and Slovaks. As previously mentioned, the Slovaks were mostly an agrarian society,
while the Czechs were a more industrialized nation with improved transportation; one could
assume that the two sectors would complement one another. At the outset of the Republic, the
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agricultural sector of Slovakia was “less advanced than that of the other parts of former
Hungary.”81 What little industrial labor the Slovaks did, did not contribute much to the overall
output of Czechoslovakia, and foreigners owned a majority of the industries located in Slovakia.
Mamatey also pointed out that the geographical shape of Czechoslovakia caused Slovak industry
to be further from any provinces in the nation than they previously were while under Hungarian
rule. Mamatey also postulates that compared to the numerous railway connections between
Hungary and Slovakia, there were only two between Slovakia and the Czech provinces.82 This
presented yet another challenge for the new Czechoslovak government to face: how to make
industry in Slovakia more equal to the Czech lands. Korbel explains that there was “marked
economic growth” between 1924 and 1929, and economic development following until 1935 was
plagued by the worldwide depression. The economic depression added to the tensions between
the two nationalities.
It was traditional in the years leading up to the war that “the population in Slovakia’s
mountainous areas had to earn a part of the whole of its income by labor in the forests, as
seasonal agricultural laborers in the flat lands of Hungary, or in industry.”83 Because they were
now separated from Hungary, it was more difficult to get these seasonal jobs, and there were
hardly any industrial opportunities within Slovakia. However, the agricultural industry in
Slovakia did benefit from better organization during the interwar period. According to Zora
Pryor, “acreage and yields rose, and for some crops sizeable markets were found in the western
provinces.”84
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Even with political disagreement and economic tensions concerning the status of Slovaks
within the Republic, “education, culture, and art proved to be areas where progress was made
more swiftly.”85 There was massive reform in education in Slovakia after Czechoslovakia was
created, which greatly improved the development of Slovak culture. Teich explains that “by the
mid-1920s, the former Hungarian school system had been totally reformed, the Slovak language
had been introduced in schools, and compulsory school attendance had been reinforced by the
terms of the Little Education Act of 1922.”86 In 1919, the Czechoslovak government created
Comenius University in Bratislava and its purpose was to provide university-level education to
the Slovak intelligentsia. One cannot ignore the assistance that Czech officials gave in Slovakia
at this time. These Czech officials helped in all sectors, including industry, transportation, and
business. In the same vein, a Czech publishing house in Prague specialized in bringing Slovak
literature to Czech readers, thus expanding Slovak culture outside the Slovak lands.87 Stefan
Krcméry explained in a 1928 article that “the literary output of the Slovaks up to 1918
was…almost exclusively clergy and teachers…who remained true to their nation and took an
active part in literature and similar fields of Slovak cultural life” even though this behavior could
land them in jail, or in a few cases, exiled from Upper Hungary.88
Once the people living in the Slovak lands had been liberated from the rule of Hungary
and Magyarization, Slovak literature became the property of the entire Slovak nation, not just of
the former elite. Prewar, many of the Slovak literary intelligentsia lived in exile due to the fact
that it was illegal to write about the Slovak people and in the Slovak language. As previously
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mentioned, Hungary wanted complete unification from the people in its lands. Krcméry further
explained that “Slovakia is a classic example of the extent to which intellectual and literary
forces can be checked by unnatural political pressure and can flourish once more under the sun
of a new political freedom.”89
The Slovak population within Czechoslovakia enjoyed much progress once the war
ended: they were finally able to learn their language in schools and speak it in public without
fear of retribution, the illiteracy rate dropped, and for the first few years of the Republic, there
was economic growth for the Slovak population. When the worldwide depression hit, it took a
toll on this region, just like the rest of the world. With the added stress and uncertainty that came
from the depression, tensions between the Czechs and Slovaks mounted and right-wing
radicalism increased in the 1930s, which culminated in Germany’s Third Reich supporting an
autonomous Slovakia.90 There was a desire to return to a more traditional, conservative life for
the people in Slovakia and by the end of the century, the only answer would be to separate from
the more progressive Czechs.
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Chapter 2: The Germans
“We Czechs and Slovaks are a homogenous nation; our Germans on the other hand…do not
represent their whole nation.”91

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between the German minority
and Czech majority during the interwar period in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Czechs
and Germans have a long, rich history of rivalry that spans centuries. This opposition was so
embedded in the two peoples that by the time the First Republic was created, thoughts of actual
unity between them were impracticable. In many cases, it seemed as though the Czech majority
were attempting to take revenge on the German population they felt had controlled them during
Austro-Hungarian rule. This animosity hampered the economic and social development of the
Republic and drove the two populations further apart, thus making the infiltration of Nazism that
much easier. In part, this tension was because both groups viewed the Bohemian lands as their
historical home. Bohemia was one of the oldest national states within Europe, and with the large
German population within this area, it is understandable that these two people claimed this land
as theirs.92 According to Elizabeth Wiskemann, the Czechs saw themselves as heirs to the
Přemyslid dynasty and saw the Czech Lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia as representations
of Slav unity.93 Another aspect of the tense Czecho-German relationship was the fact that,
historically, the German nation had refused to assimilate to the cultures of their adopted land.
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Wiskemann gives several examples of this refusal by comparing them to the French Protestants
who emigrated to England and similarly refused to adopt the cultural practices or religion of their
new nation. The Hussite movement of the 15th century94 represented a heroic uprising in the
interests of religious truth for the Czechs, but the Germans viewed it as an outburst of destructive
brutality, which many believed was the typical behavior of Slavic people.95 Therefore, when the
boundaries of the new Europe were drawn at the end of World War I and the two groups were
forced into sharing a new nation, tensions ran high. The Czechoslovaks were excited by their
new freedom, but the Germans had hoped (vainly) for the triumph of Austria.
Geographical and historical rivalry aside, religion also posed an issue between the two
nationalities. The Czechs (especially Thomas Masaryk) were inspired by Jan Hus (1369-1415),
while the German people were inspired by Martin Luther (1483-1546). Luther himself was
inspired by Hus when he began his religious reform, and so during his time animosity between
the two peoples faded. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Czechs were predominantly
Catholic, while the Germans were Protestant. This is what led to many of the religious issues
between the Czechs and Germans in the First Republic. After the death of King Louis of
Bohemia in 1526, the Bohemian Diet96 elected the Habsburg Ferdinand to lead. Because
Ferdinand was German, he was distrusted by the Czechs. Ferdinand’s regal position meant that
German people became the most prominent and powerful. Czech representation at court became
heavily influenced by German culture because Czech leaders wanted to place themselves closer
to the center of power. Court administration was conducted in German instead of Czech. This
94
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began to change in the seventeenth century when the Czech Bohemian nobility began to check
the privileges of German leaders. They did this by shouting down a German-speaking
representative in the Bohemian Diet in 1611 and by forbidding the acquisition of land to anyone
that did not speak Czech in 1615. However, this behavior only entrenched the hostility. The
Thirty Years War broke out a few years later, and at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620,
the Czech Bohemian nobility was so heavily defeated by the Germans that their population was
reduced to only peasants and workmen.97 After this war, German peasants were brought to the
Czech Lands from Austria, Swabia, and Bavaria to settle the depopulated areas, and this
migration led to a social and economic hierarchy in which the Germans were on top and the
Czechs at the bottom.
Language was another layer of the animosity, even before the creation of
Czechoslovakia. Empress Maria Theresa, who understood that she was unable to completely
denationalize many of her people or eliminate any non-German languages, thus introduced the
study of Czech at the University of Vienna in 1775. Wiskemann postulates that Maria Theresa
and her son Joseph were inspired by eighteenth-century French notions of equality, which led to
the introduction of public education supported by the Habsburg government. Despite French
influences, elementary and grammar schools in the empire were taught in German only.98
Wiskemann follows this analysis by also stating that this use of German only in public education
created the beginnings of the language question that plagued the following two centuries. The
future Czechoslovak nation based much, if not all, of their legislation on a person’s native
language. With the Germanization of the public education system in the eighteenth century, more
interest in German industry grew. The Austrian government encouraged German immigration to
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the Bohemian and Moravian lands as long as they provided industry.99 This led to an increase in
German speakers in the Czech lands and further shrunk the population of Czech speakers, or at
least reduced that population. This practice of making the conqueror’s language the language of
the state and forcing the conquered to learn and speak it can be found throughout imperialist
history.
Wiskemann asserts that “out of the Age of Enlightenment, in the later years of the
eighteenth century, was born the Romantic Revival and the spirit of modern nationalism and the
Czech-German problem.”100 Then, around the turn of the century, the modern consciousness of
Czechs and Germans emerged. The thinking that came from the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 was
that the Slavs had been continually interrupted by outside conquerors in their attempts to create
their own communities. In the vein of nationalism, traditionally the Slav people had egalitarian
principles and tried to create common groups in which no one ruled over anyone else. However,
the German people pontificated “aggressive ideologies” from the early nineteenth century
concerning beliefs that “some races are born to rule others,” or what Wiskemann calls a racial
caste-hierarchy.101 Because of forced Germanization in the eighteenth century, the rift between
the two peoples grew. This contention between the two peoples was present well into the
twentieth century and in the first Republic. From the mid-to-late nineteenth century, new
governmental acts were written that emphasized the indispensability of the German-Czech
relationship to alleviate some of the tension, but included caveats with which the Czechs
disagreed: a state German language, an administrative division in Bohemia, Moravia, and Tyrol,
and that the German language be equal to the Czech language in Prague (even though the
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German population here was approximately five percent).102 This was a huge request; Prague had
long been the center of the Czech lands. It became the capital of the new Republic and remains
the capital of Czechia today. Even though there was a state German language at this time,
minority populations could still use their mother tongues in a municipal capacity as long as the
minority population made up twenty percent of the overall population of the area.103 So, the fact
that the Germans wanted to place their language on the same level as Czech in an area where
they only made up five percent of the population showed how bold they were and emphasized
the favoritism of the Austrian government.
There were two attempts to bridge the divide between these peoples: the Moravian
Compromise of 1905 and the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907. The Moravian
Compromise sought to fix relations between Czechs and Germans by making the representation
within the Diet at Brno more equal. According to A.J.P. Taylor, the Moravian Compromise
“showed how two peoples of different nationality could live together in the same province; it did
not show how two nations could settle their conflicting historical claims.”104 The German
minority in the Moravian Diet insisted on having more power than their population numbers
should have allowed; however, being the favorite of the monarchy had its perks. The
compromise guaranteed the Czechs seventy-three seats to the Germans’ forty. This still meant
that the Germans had a good amount of power within the diet because, in order to pass
legislation, there needed to be a two-thirds majority vote; the Germans maintained effective veto
power.105 The electorate in the diet were also restricted by their registered nationality; Germans

102

Ibid., 52.
Ibid., 52.
104
A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 200.
105
Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich, 9.
103

37

could only elect Germans and Czechs could only elect Czechs. However, a person was unable to
choose which nationality they registered as. In other words, some Czechs found themselves
registered with the Germans because these registries came “from above.”106 One of the goals of
the Moravian Compromise was to set up another Czech university (they only had one at this
time), however, this goal was unattainable due to the resistance of municipal or local elections
thanks to the power of the Germans in the municipal diets. When universal suffrage came in
1907 (“universal” did not mean every person in these lands could vote, it only meant the men in
the intelligentsia and above), a poor man had no say in his local elections because only the
nobility could vote. While this appears somewhat backwards, it served a purpose for the
powerful as it enabled them to maintain regional control while projecting an image of expanded
suffrage. At this time in prewar Austria, the number of rich Czechs was increasing, but these
lands were still heavily German.107 While questions about nationality were important to the
nobility of this time, the lower class did not worry as much about what nationality they belonged
to as they were likely more concerned about keeping food on the table.
Before 1918, predominantly Czech towns were run by German councils. Places such as
Olomouc and Ostrava (in Moravia), and Budějovice (in Southern Bohemia) “were administered
wholly by Germans,” while in Brno (in which the population was at least half Czech), there was
not a single Czech local councilor.108 The nationalist arguments of the time were rooted in class
struggles between the privileged (German) and the underprivileged (Czech). Essentially, because
a person was born into a German family, their mother tongue was German, which meant they
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had an advantage over non-Germans from birth. This is another example of colonizer behavior:
they kept the Czechs disenfranchised so that they could not gain enough power to make changes.
World War I presented opportunities and obstacles to the Czech anti-Habsburg resistance
since, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they were called to war alongside the Central
Powers. During the War, the progress of the Czech anti-Habsburg resistance was based on the
ups and downs of the war. The Czech right-wing hoped that the Russian Czar would come to
their rescue, but ultimately those hopes waned after the Russians were driven out of Galicia in
May 1915 and German and Austro-Hungarian occupation overtook large areas of prewar
Russia.109 The Czechs found themselves tasked with defending German imperialism (in the form
of both Germany and Austria-Hungary), even though this imperialism was associated with
aggressive policies and oppression toward the Czechs themselves. Eduard Beneš and Thomas
Masaryk spent their time trying to stimulate interest for an independent Czech state among
foreign powers like France, Britain, and the United States. Czech history was (and arguably still
is) less known in the West. The Easter Demands, written by the Germans in Austria and
published in March 1916, outlined a postwar Austria in the event the Germans and AustroHungarians were successful in the war. Their demands were such that “Slav numerical
predominance was to be…curtailed by cutting away…Galicia, Bukovina, and Dalmatia…from
central parliamentary representation.” German would be the official language throughout the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. They specified that “even in Prague, Czech could only be used in
lower courts and no longer in appeals to the higher ones.”110 Bohemia would be split up into a
German and a bilingual administrative area, rather than half-and-half German and Czech.
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However, as the war went on, it became obvious that things were not working out for the
Central Powers and the Easter Demands, from the start, were extremely optimistic. During this
time, many Czechs were conscripted to fight for the nation that had oppressed them for centuries
and “went to the front with their hearts full of hatred…[and] fought as little as possible and
entered the Allies’ ranks whenever they could.”111 Austro-Hungarian Emperor Francis Joseph’s
successor Charles attempted to appease the Czechs when he released Karel Kramář and Alois
Rašín (who had been sentenced to death).112 He also attempted to pacify the angry Germans by
agreeing to create a province in the Czech Lands: German-Bohemia. Importantly, in 1918,
Charles decided to completely side with the Germans to “implement the plans for splitting up
Bohemia into two parts;” however, he did not consult the Czechs. So, at this point, the Germans
still had hope when it came to who would rule once the war was done.113 According to
Wiskemann, “the democratic rationalist tradition, which they were striving to build up, caused
them to honor the professor rather than the general,” and it was this lack of military aggression
that led to the Czechs resisting fighting for the German military.114
Masaryk’s advocacy for a Czechoslovak state during the war consisted of demanding
unity of the Czech Lands, with the addition of the Slovaks. Masaryk was determined to keep the
German minority in the First Czechoslovak Republic because “Bohemia [was] a quite unique
example of a mixed country; in no country [were] there two nationalities so intermixed and
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interwoven…as Bohemia.”115 Masaryk’s solution to the issue between Czechs and Germans was
that no singular group should rule over the other, but seeing as that was a long shot, he asked
this: “Which is more just – that 10 million Czechs should live under foreign rule, or that 2½
million non-Czechs should be under Czech rule?”116 Masaryk believed that the Czech State
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) was economically viable enough to handle being independent.
When it came to the Germans in Bohemia, Eduard Beneš wrote:
The Prague delegates also laid emphasis on the question of the Germans in Bohemia. It
was also recognized that in this respect we must proceed cautiously so as not to create
any prejudice for ourselves when vindicating the historical frontiers of the Czech
territories. We therefore unanimously passed a resolution that the definitive government
should include one German as a regional Minister without Portfolio.117
This action was an appeasement to the Germans in hopes that they would cooperate with the
burgeoning government. The Czechs were at least attempting to offer representation to the
Germans (even if it was in the form of just one person).
At the first meeting of the provisional Parliament on November 14, 1918, the Czech
Social Democrat František Tomášek and the first Premier Karel Kramář addressed the German
population. The former commented on the fact that the only representation at this meeting was
that of Czech and Slovak; no Germans were present. Kramář made the claim that “the German
people living within the borders of [the] State need not to harbor the least fear for the national
development.” Here, he was assuring the German population that although Czechs, Slovaks, and
Germans were different, no one needed to worry about their treatment under the state.118
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When Masaryk addressed the provisional National Assembly on December 22, 1918, he
delivered a message that was understood by the German population as an insult to their rights to
live in the Czechoslovak lands. In his address, he referred to the German citizens of the Republic
as “immigrants” and the Czech population as “indigenous.” While it may be true that historically
the lands that now made up the First Republic had been settled by the Czechs, German speakers
had been in these lands for centuries leading up to the twentieth and it was problematic for
Masaryk to leave out that part of the very tangled history. These comments fueled anti-Czech
propaganda. Masaryk somewhat retracted his words in an address to the nation in 1919, saying:
Democracy is also my guideline in the question of nationalities. I recognize the national
principle and the right to self-determination but the given administrative circumstances
there are boundaries which are the result of national interrelationships and which make
any straight frontier demarcation impracticable. A union of the German minorities is
geographically not feasible, just as it is not feasible to unite all Czech minorities
geographically. There is no other way for them, but to remain together…There is
moreover an obvious difference in the application of the right to self-determination. With
the exception of a few small frontier minorities, we Czechs and Slovaks are a
homogenous nation; our Germans on the other hand do not represent their whole
nation.119
The biggest takeaway from this passage is that no clean frontier lines could be drawn around the
different ethnicities that lived in the First Republic. Masaryk believed that the only viable option
for both Czechs and Slovaks was the combination of the two into one state. He knew that the
citizens of the German minority could look to another state when it came to representation, while
the Czechoslovaks had only had each other.
Just as the Slovaks found inspiration in the Wilsonian notion of self-determination, so too
did the Germans under the First Republic. They believed that US President Woodrow Wilson’s
definition of this concept in his Fourteen Point Plan applied to them as well and they resented the
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fact that the Czech liberator, Masaryk, was not a champion for the Germans as well.120 Before
1918, the two most prominent German political groups, the German Social Democrats and
German Nationalists, had been at odds with one another, unable to agree on almost anything. But
now, they had a mutual interest: achieving self-determination. On October 21, 1918, German
politicians (previously elected in Austria in 1911) proclaimed “jurisdiction over the whole
German ethnic area, particularly the Sudeten territories.” They declared themselves the
Provisional Provincial Diet for the entirety of German Bohemia. This area was not defined by
any boundary lines; instead, it was more of a concept written down on paper.121 Districts in both
north and south Moravia and Silesia were created in addition to German-Bohemia as well.
However, none of these provincial diets lasted more than a few weeks. Bruegel explains that one
of the biggest challenges facing the German-Bohemian Diet was malnutrition and starvation left
over from the war, but they were ill-equipped to deal with the issues unless an agreement (Modus
Vivendi) could be reached between the Germans and the Czechs in Prague. Despite the fact that
these provincial diets dissolved within a few weeks of their creation, this was a clear attempt the
Germans made toward achieving their own self-determination within the First Republic.
Once the delegates at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference approved the First Republic, “the
absolutely democratic character of the Czechoslovak Republic increased the power of population
agitation, while its insistence upon the Czech language and tradition meant that, in spite of fairly
liberal laws, the new state was frequently tempted to accept an alliance with the Czech societies
against the Sudeten German organizations.”122 Leadership in the First Republic was based
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proportionately on the population. The Sudeten Germans were a fairly large population within
the Republic, but they were outnumbered by the Czechoslovaks. The founders of the Republic
and the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference intentionally did this so that the Germans could
not gain too much power. According to Wiskemann, when the Republic was created, the Czechs
set out to humiliate the Germans in the way that they believed they had been humiliated under
German rule for the centuries leading up to the First World War. For example, the chief CzechAustrian frontier station Břeclav replaced all German words and street names with French, as if
to punish German speakers, a particularly potent gesture given their defeat in the war by the
French.123
When confronted with the question of why there was no formal invitation to the Germans
as the new state was being formed, Masaryk responded, saying:
As long as this [German] attitude continued, it was not formally possible to offer
membership of the National Assembly to the Germans. This would have created a
conflict of conscience for them and we would have risked our advances being rebuffed.
But even if they had accepted, what use would their presence there have been,
considering their attitude at the time?
By “attitude,” Masaryk meant that until the Peace Treaty was signed, most Germans in the Czech
Lands referred to themselves as citizens of Austria.124 The first discussion of the German Social
Democrats with the government happened on December 20, 1919, in which their main demand
was full representation within the Constituent Assembly. However, the premier who had
replaced Kramář, a prominent Czech journalist and Social Democrat named Vlastimil Tusar, shot
down that idea, citing that Germans had always formed “governments of defiance.”125 It is
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important to note that the National Assembly was formed out of revolutionary law,126 in which
the new government was formed in the wake of the Habsburg Empire’s collapse, meaning that
the new state was created based on the needs at the time with less regard to a solid future.
One of the most important pieces of legislation during this period was the Language Law.
This law passed on February 29, 1920, along with the rest of the Czechoslovak Constitution.
While reading through the Constitution, one would be hard-pressed to find any sort of innate bias
in relation to the German population. All citizens of the First Republic were guaranteed equal
rights before the law, as well as the right to use the language of their choosing; no more would a
person be subjected to ridicule or poverty because of their mother tongue. In fact, it was not the
actual constitution that created the issues the Sudeten Germans faced; it was other laws passed
outside the constitution that led to an inherent inequality between the Czechoslovaks and
minorities within the state. In regard to the Language Law, Bruegel explains that it “was, more
than anything else, an act of revenge for the discrimination the Czechs in Austria, and the
Slovaks in Hungary, had had to bear and, vicariously, for the even worse fate that would have
been in store for the Slav nations had the Germans won the war.”127 Masaryk was adamant that
he wanted full justice for both the Czechoslovaks and Germans, and when the first draft of the
law was submitted to him, he returned it with lengthy comments regarding its fairness.
Fairness also came in the form of regulating language. Within the smallest juridical unit
(that of local districts), if a minority made up twenty percent or more of the population, then the
courts were obliged to accept all requests (written and oral) in the mother tongue while replies
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were to be given in Czech and the minority language the request was submitted in.128 The twenty
percent rule was a remnant from the old Austrian regime.129 The last article of the constitution
stated that “every manner whatsoever of forcible denationalization is prohibited. Non-observance
of this principle may be proclaimed by law to be a punishable act.”130 Here, the law prohibited
any kind of denationalization, the opposite of Austro-Hungarian Empire imperial policies that
sought to homogenize the population under Germanic culture. This article created an issue with
language equality: Czech and Slovak (or Czechoslovak) could be used no matter what, whereas
languages such as German required a particular number of citizens before they could use their
language in any official capacity. Thus, while the language law offered what looked like equality
for everyone, this equality came with a few caveats. Wiskemann explains that in the time leading
up to the formation of the First Republic, there was ardent protest among the Czechs regarding
an official national language. However, the Sudeten Germans were eager to point out that as
soon as the Czechs had their own nation, they were quick to claim the national language as
Czechoslovak.131
Countries like Britain and France believed that Czechoslovakia was a united national
state. On the surface, this was true. Underneath, the nationalities of the First Republic were not
united, and this disconnect between the Allies and the new Republic contributed to many of the
border issues throughout the first iteration of the Czechoslovak Republic. The Paris Conference
determined that all successor states from the old Austro-Hungarian rule were “national states”
even though the states themselves could not be formed solely around cultural or ethnic lines; it
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was more like randomly selecting pieces of land and carving them out without any particular
thought as to who lived there. According to Beneš, the Conference referred to them as national
states because they had fulfilled national aspirations. However, they conceded that the states
could not have been formed around any one people. He also mentioned later that these
expressions were used to contrast the old Austro-Hungarian State.132
During the first census of the new Republic, recorded in 1921, more problems arose
between the Sudeten Germans and Czechs. The nationality of a citizen within the republic was
based on mother tongue (first language spoken), but the use of another language within daily life
was considered. The Jewish citizens of Czechoslovakia were allowed to choose their nationality
separately from the rest of the population and because of this, the German minority actually lost
more people who claimed to be German. Coupled with the emigration of old German officials to
Austria and young officials to Germany, the Sudeten German population faced heavy losses
between 1910 and 1920.133 The confusion that came with the very first census of the Republic
was somewhat expected because, with the loss of the Habsburg regime structure, the entirety of
Central-Eastern Europe was unsure of the future.
Language was not the only factor that affected national identity at this time; education
also played a major role in the relationship between Germans and Czechs. Both German and
Czech demonstrations occurred on any given day through 1921 to 1925, and a large portion of
them were focused on the closing of German schools. The Germans complained that Czech
families moved into German districts and thus a Czech school was needed. Before the collapse of
the Empire, Germans moving into predominantly Czech districts led to the creation of German
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schools.134 But the Germans in Czechoslovakia chose to have selective memories about this
particularity. Even the building of Czech schools in areas where Czechs were the minority was a
massive change from the old regime. Before the First Republic, there were few Czech schools in
comparison to German schools. Wiskemann argues that the German officials in Czechoslovakia
held disdain towards the state as a whole and “made it clear that they believed the Republic to be
merely a temporary misfortune.”135
By 1925, the socioeconomic status of German citizens was much worse than that of their
Czechoslovak counterparts136, but they only received five percent of state scholarships. The
number of German elementary schools fell by 285 between 1921 and 1934. Because of this
decline, some Germans felt as though the Sudeten and Bohemian German citizens were that
much closer to being cut off from the motherland.137 By 1935, the number of minority schools in
Czechoslovakia (including German schools) had declined, proving that the idea of the Minorities
Treaty138 was good on paper but was not upheld by the Czechoslovak government.139
Another issue for the German minority was the foreign policy of the First Republic,
which appeared to have a strong emphasis on the new status quo that was built at the end of the
war. The most important figure in Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy was the Foreign Minister Dr.
Eduard Beneš. His most ardent concern was maintaining good relationships with
Czechoslovakia’s allies and ensuring cooperation. In 1920 and 1921, Beneš created the Little
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Entente with Yugoslavia and Romania, two small states similarly created at the end of the war
and “whose existence depended upon the maintenance of the Treaty of Trianon.”140 Beneš
explained in an interview with TR Ybarra for The New York Times on September 26, 1920, that
“one of the principals underlying causes for this alliance of these three southeastern European
nations is their mutual protection against Hungary.”141
According to Wiskemann, the Sudeten Germans resented the Little Entente and saw it as
a form of French subjugation. They looked down on Yugoslavia and Romania because “they
were ‘wretched little states,’ and the Serbs were the ‘ruffians’ who had started the War.” 142 They
also believed that in order to be successful, Czechoslovakia needed to cooperate with Austria and
Germany. Czechoslovakia’s initial relations with Weimar Germany were diplomatic. and the
German government regarded Czechoslovakia with “far less contempt than Poland.”143 However,
good relations with Germany did not last long. In 1925 and 1926, Beneš was involved in the
Locarno discussions,144 and was presiding on the day in which Germany was admitted to the
League of Nations. Sudeten Germans viewed this as an advantage because if they presented their
concerns with the Minority Treaty in Czechoslovakia, the issue was more likely to receive
support from a major power.145 Some, like Gustav Stresemann, then Minister of Foreign Affairs
for the German Reich, believed that the Sudeten Germans should have worked with the
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Czechoslovak government to accomplish what they wanted. Although, one could ask how a
group of people were supposed to work with a government accused of failing to uphold
constitutional law. One issue that the Sudeten Germans had with Czechoslovakia’s foreign
policy was that it seemed to favor France over Germany. Wiskemann mentions that any Sudeten
German petitions sent to Geneva never actually made it before the League.146 Whether or not this
was due to Beneš, who definitely favored France, is up for debate.
When Adolf Hitler became Germany’s Chancellor in 1933, Germany’s relationship with
Czechoslovakia began to sour as Hitler became more intentional about his expansionist desires
into Eastern Europe. The Sudeten Germans felt that Beneš’s Parisian career could lead to a
French-Czechoslovak alliance that would block German expansionism. According to
Wiskemann, both the Sudeten Germans and the Third Reich felt that Beneš was “a particularly
venomous enemy of Germany.”147 The right-wing German parties in Czechoslovakia claimed
they wanted nothing but “national demarcation and the complete autonomy of every racial
group” within the borders; however, they also stated that “a greater German empire…which
economically dominates the Balkans and the southeastern states, are war demands which are
justified by [their] superior military position.”148 Here, it is obvious that the Germans in
Czechoslovakia were struggling under a government they saw as not fully representative. There
were several different German political parties within Czechoslovakia, and they tended to lean
one of two ways: toward activism or negativism.149
The German National Socialist party in the Sudetenland was staunchly against activism.
When Hitler rose to the top of the National-Sozilitische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei in Munich, the
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German-Bohemian Nazis were thrilled with this development. Just like the Nazis of Germany,
the Czechoslovak Nazis were anti-Semitic and anti-democratic; Hitler gave them something to
back. Wiskemann states that the Nazis of Czechoslovakia wore the same uniforms and displayed
the same banners as their German counterparts.150 The Sudeten Nazis protested against activism
and emphasized Pan-German unity, but other German groups claimed the Nazis were the one
group that presented the most obstacles to achieving what they wanted. The Sudeten Nazis
attracted young people and, in doing so, their representation in Parliament rose from five in 1920
to eight in 1929. After 1929, all Sudeten Nazi youths were organized into the Volkssport, which
behaved the same as Hitler’s Brownshirts in the Reich and wore a very similar uniform.151
Between 1931 and 1932, the Sudeten Nazis were able to expand their activities to outside
the Sudetenland, but the Czechoslovak authorities put a stop to it. Because of Nazi activities and
the rhetoric of Hitlerism, many Czechs (particularly the ones who were already prone to
“Germanophobia”) felt this to be the true light of the German people and thus a justification of
their aversion to Germans.152 The line was further drawn between the two people when Jewish
refugees crossed into Czechoslovakia with stories of Hitler’s Germany. The Czechs were “not as
surprised as Western Europe” when they heard, and they believed the only way to stop it was to
take a strong line against fascism by “stealing the enemy’s weapons” and not holding up their
hands passively.153 When the Austrian government repressed the Nazis in June 1933,
Czechoslovakia sought to do the same. Pressure for the dissolution of the German National Party
in Czechoslovakia mounted and they did in fact dissolve themselves in October of that year;
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however, that did not mean the end of the Nazi movement in the Sudetenland. As a result of this
dissolution, several members of municipal governments were replaced by activist nominees.154
Hitler sent two emissaries to Czechoslovakia toward the end of 1936: Albrecht Haushofer
and Count Trauttmansdorff. He intended them to negotiate with Beneš (now President of the
Republic) on a return to peaceful negotiations between Germany and Czechoslovakia concerning
the Sudetenland. The emissaries proposed a nonaggression pact with Czechoslovakia in which
“Germany would not raise the boundary question for an appropriate period of time in return for
the complete cultural autonomy and economic equality of the Sudeten Germans.” This proposal
essentially enabled Germany to interfere with internal Czechoslovakian affairs.155
When Haushofer returned to Berlin, he presented Heinrich Himmler and Hitler with a list
of aims he thought could be achieved: a bilateral nonaggression pact, Czechoslovak neutrality in
the event of a Russian attack on Germany, a trade agreement, and improvement in the Sudeten
German situation.156 Hitler rejected the nonaggression pact due to his desire to invade
Czechoslovakia in the future. When Germany invaded Austria in March of 1938, the German
government assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin that Germany was solely concerned
with Austria and there would not be any impact on Czechoslovakia. Of course, this was untrue,
as Hitler told his generals that he fully intended to invade both Austria and Czechoslovakia
simultaneously in order to gain food for five to six million people, given a few million in each
respective country emigrated.157 The plan to invade Czechoslovakia was called Operation Green
and the German government pushed it enthusiastically. In May 1938, Britain reported German
troops occupying southern Silesia and Austria and the Czechoslovak government with small
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mobilizations.158 This pressure by Germany on Czechoslovakia to cede the Sudetenland, citing
the ethnic Germans living there, led to the infamous 1938 Munich Crises during which Hitler,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and French Premier Édouard Daladier met to
negotiate the cession of the territory. While Czechoslovak politicians were not invited to this
important meeting, they were ultimately forced to cede the Sudetenland to the Third Reich.
While Britain and France had supported the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1919, they failed to
support the First Republic in the face of the Nazi threat.
The bitter, shared history of the German and Czech peoples in this land led to a plethora
of issues once the borders were drawn for the First Republic. The Germans felt as though they
were cut off from their motherland. Much of the interaction between the two seemed as though
the Czechs were vengeful against the Germans for centuries of Austrian oppression. These
tensions helped foster a growth in Nazism in the Sudetenland and made it that much easier for
Hitler to invade. The anger on both sides is understandable: the Czechs had been taken over
centuries beforehand when the Germans were favorites of the crown, and the Germans were
angry at their sudden minority status after having lost the war.
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Chapter 3: The Hungarians, Ukrainians, and Jews
“There is no uniform solution for the problem of national minorities; each minority presents a
special problem of its own.”159

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate several of the smaller minorities’ identities
within the First Republic. There are very few writings in English concerning these smaller
minorities, and consequently, the examination of their roles within the Republic is very limited
for this study. While the Hungarian, Ukrainian, and Jewish populations are the focus of this
chapter, there were also small populations of Roma, Polish, and Russian nationalities. The
historical relationships between the Czechoslovaks and the three nationalities presented in this
chapter led the Czechoslovak government to treat each of these minorities differently, despite
presenting a bastion of democracy and equality to the world.
Academic literature on the Roma, Russian, and Polish minorities in the First Republic in
English is severely lacking and knowledge concerning the question of the Republic’s
commitment to equality would benefit greatly from more accessible sources. While English
language scholarship on the Roma is wanting, there is a large volume entitled Roma Voices in
History edited by Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, in which they “propose a new
approach and to lay the foundations for a new reading of Roma history.”160 There is a forty-page
chapter that uses letters (both in the original language and translated) to a few municipal
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governments and President Masaryk concerning the Roma in Czechoslovakia. While this is an
excellent contribution to the historiography, unfortunately it does not provide enough
information to warrant an entire section on the Roma in this chapter.161 A similar lack of English
language publications exists for the Polish and Russian population, and the literature that does
exist relates to statistics and the Minority Law, of which Jan Kuklík and René Petráš offer a
thorough study in their book Minorities and Law in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992. Because of the
date range for their study, there are only a few sections on the smaller minorities. Given that the
history of Czechoslovakia was not well researched by western historians until more recently, it is
unsurprising that there is less on these minorities than the other populations in the Republic.
The attitude of the Czechoslovak government toward these nationalities was not uniform
because it supported some while it seemed as though the government was seeking vengeance
against others. The Hungarians had been favored by the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy prior
to World War I, and this favor meant the Slovak population was often treated as lower class
(much in the same way that the Czechs were treated by the Germans during their time under
Austria, albeit not nearly as brutally). The Czechoslovak government supported the Ukrainian
population (particularly the intelligentsia) in their pursuits to spread information about their
homeland. An interesting juxtaposition exists when one looks at the Hungarian and Ukrainian
populations. While Masaryk dreamt of a European democracy that ensured equality to all, in
reality, there was too much bad history between the Hungarians and the Czechoslovaks under the
Dual Monarchy, which is a similar problem to the issues between the Czechs and Germans. The
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Ukrainian population in the First Republic had more freedom to celebrate their nationality than
the Hungarians did. The Jewish population, like the Ukrainians, had the support of Masaryk, but
still struggled under Czechoslovak government because of centuries of anti-Semitism that
affected their daily lives in the Republic.
There was a long history between the Hungarians and the Slovak population in EastCentral Europe. After the destruction of the Habsburg Empire at the end of WWI, new
multinational state lines were formed. As discussed in earlier chapters, the establishment of the
First Republic involved negotiating around many ethnic groups with historically tense
relationships, and the Hungarian minority population experienced their own difficulties in the
new state. The Hungarians in interwar Czechoslovakia were cut off from their homeland (very
similarly to the Sudeten German population) and the Hungarians expressed an irredentist
conception of their relationship with the newly formed government. The Slovaks resented the
Hungarians for the previous regime’s policy of Magyarization.162 This antipathy toward their
new government contributed to some of the issues they faced during the First Republic because
of emigration. Although the Czechoslovak government prided itself on the equality of all of its
citizens, and their constitution stated that all citizens within the Republic would be treated
equally before the law, in practice this was not always the case and the Hungarian population
steadily declined throughout the twenty years of the First Republic’s existence. László Szarka
comments that the Hungarian populations in “Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia almost
without exception considered minority status to have been forced upon them by international
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constitutional and geopolitical changes.”163 This sentiment made sense because the Hungarians
felt that they had been unlucky when the border lines were drawn and they got stuck on the
wrong side.
In the first census after WWI, taken in 1920, the Hungarian population measured about
650,500 and represented about 21% of the population in Slovakia. The concentration of the
Hungarian population in Slovakia is due to the fact that, prior to the war, the Slovak lands were
under the control of the Hungarian half of the dual monarchy, and Hungary bordered the
southern part of Slovakia. The 1930 Czechoslovak census recorded a decline to about 585,400
Hungarians and their population in Slovakia dropped to 17.6%.164 This was due to several
factors, including governmental representation, religious issues, and educational policies.
Religious and ethnic identity were intertwined for many people in the First Republic, and
the Hungarians were no exception. The “majority of the population in Slovakia belonged to the
Roman Catholics,” but Martin Hetényi states that “synergetic links of ethnic and religious
identity, in the case of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, was reflected in the Reformed
Church.”165 The religious beliefs of this minority affected both their social and political
development within the nation. According to Hetényi:
Henrik Geduly, a bishop of the Evangelical Church, appealed through a pastoral letter to
Slovak believers to remain in the bond of the Hungarian Church. Besides Geduly, two
other pro-Hungarian oriented bishops were at the head of this church in Slovakia. The
government promptly intervened against them and since January 1919, they were
prohibited to perform rights and responsibilities associated with their ranks, and
consequently emigrated.166
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The Hungarians left Czechoslovakia during the same time period the Germans were emigrating
to Austria and Germany. Hetényi goes on to say that the Protestants appeared from Hungarian
organizations, and by 1924, the Hungarian Evangelical Alliance was established in Slovakia.167
Catholic Church districts were not considered when the Czechoslovak lands were carved
out at the Paris Peace Conference, and when the Treaty of Trianon officially established borders,
many dioceses had offices that were, at that point, abroad. Because of this new geographic
context, Czechoslovak officials often interfered with the clergy.168 In 1921, Pope Pius XI
established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and appointed three Slovak bishops. Many
priests in Slovakia were of Hungarian nationality because the majority of this population in
Slovakia were Roman Catholic and “during the interwar period, the ratio of this religion
remained at the level of 71%.”169 These priests pledged allegiance to the Republic but did not
want to give up their pro-Hungarian loyalty.170 The Constitution of 1920 had regulations
regarding the relationship between church and state; it allowed for complete religious freedom
for all citizens within the Republic. The adoption of the Modus Vivendi in 1928 ruled that no
diocese could exceed the borders of Czechoslovakia.171 Anyone who wanted to be part of the
clergy at this time would have to sign an agreement pledging their allegiance to the Republic.172
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While Hungarians struggled for church acceptance in Slovakia because of their previous
Magyarization of the Slovak population during Hungarian rule, they were also banned from
singing the Hungarian national anthem. The national anthem was a reminder for Czechs and
Slovaks of their past suppression under Austria-Hungary and thus was prohibited. Officials
claimed the song had irredentist undertones, and under Act No. 50/1923 singing it was a
misdemeanor crime.173 Here, one can discern the irony that existed within the First Republic: the
government espoused equality yet disallowed even the most basic level of freedom of speech for
one of their minorities. Because of the majority’s hesitation to accept Hungarian pride in their
nationality, many Hungarians stopped attending religious gatherings such as their
“commemoration of St. Stephen’s tradition” and Hungarian feasts.174
Foreign policy and religion were not the only political issues that affected the Hungarian
minority; representation within the government also affected how the Hungarians were treated.
According to Andrej Tóth and Lukáš Novotný, “in both electoral districts with Hungarian
minority…one deputy mandate represented about ten thousand more voters than in other
electoral districts in Slovakia.”175 Although “Czechoslovak legislation was relatively generous
with minority rights…there were obstacles to applying [the Language Act] in practice, as the
Czech officials who had replaced the Hungarians were unable to speak the local language.”176
Again, there is a discrepancy with official policy not holding up to the nation’s claims to
equality. There were now government officials in positions where they would have to
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communicate with the populace, but they had no way of doing so effectively. However, because
of the historical and contemporary issues between the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians, Czech
and Slovak officials did not want Hungarians in governmental positions.
Not only did the Czechoslovak government fear irredentism from its Hungarian
minority; the new state’s diplomatic relationship with fellow new state, Hungary, was also tense.
Hetényi postulates that this foreign policy, in international eyes, was a threat to the Republic’s
existence, along with Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Józef Beck’s Poland. Hungary aided Hitler to
permanently change the Treaty of Trianon to grant land back to the “mother countries.”177 Some
Hungarians (along with the German minority) viewed Czech and Slovak rule as an “ethnical
dictatorship.”178 Fear of irredentist rhetoric was not present only in the political sphere, but in
education as well. There were a few differences as to how education was handled for the
Hungarians compared to other minorities. For example, the Ukrainians had a free university in
Prague, but most Hungarian educational institutions were shut down after 1918. The Ministry of
Schools and National Enlightenment justified the removal of schools by measures it adopted.
Quoted in “University Education and Hungarian Minority in Slovakia 1918-1938,” Sona
Gabzdilová wrote that the “abolishment of Hungarian Universit[ies] was not ‘a heavy cultural
injustice, because also during [the] previous regime [the Universities were] not exceptional and
had no tradition.’”179 Gabzdilová goes on to explain that the government justified its actions by
explaining that universities such as The Academy of Law in Košice “was not considered by [the]
government as equal to [the] level of university education,” or these universities did not offer the

177

Ibid., 75.
Michal Simane, “Sustainable Education on the Example of Establishment of Czech Primary Minority Schools in
Interwar Czechoslovakia,” Discourse and Communication for Sustainable Education 10, no. 1 (2019): 94.
179
Sona Gabzdilová, “University Education and Hungarian Minority in Slovakia 1918-1938,” Central European
Papers vol. 2 (2019): 36.
178

60

right kind of education in the eyes of the Czechoslovak government. The Czechoslovaks viewed
the Hungarian schools as one of the “primary tool[s] of Hungarization [or Magyarization],” and
thus were reminders of the past.180 Some of the universities that were shut down were the
Hungarian Regal University of Queen Elizabeth (also known as Elizabeth University) in
Bratislava and the Academy of Law in Košice.181 The significance of these institutions is that
they taught in the Hungarian language. Without them, Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were left
without a facility for higher education in their mother tongue.
Lack of access to an advanced education in their mother tongue led many Hungarians
living in Slovakia to attend university in Hungary, but this brought on its own issues. According
to Gabzdilová, Security authorities monitored Hungarian minority students and they were
documented by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They listed the names of students
and their families, as well as their military obligations and loyalty to the Republic. Gabzdilová
goes on to explain that the Ministry also took note of which government authorities issued
passports to these students. Minister Vavro Šrobar adopted government regulations in July 1921,
which restricted the issuance of passports to students who intended to study in Hungary: they
could only obtain the passports if they could not complete their diploma in the Republic or if
they had to perform tests to complete said diploma in Hungary. The Ministry of Schools and
National Enlightenment ruled that diplomas issued in Hungary after 1928 would not be honored
in the Czechoslovak Republic. Hungary adopted the same approach when it came to Hungarian
citizens earning a diploma in the Czechoslovak Republic. This meant that the Hungarian
minority students in the Republic had two options: continue their education in Czech, German, or
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Slovak schools, or they could go to school in Hungary but not be able to utilize their diploma
back in Czechoslovakia.182
Similar to the dearth of scholarship on the Hungarian minority, too little English language
scholarship exists on the Ukrainian minority. A recent and welcome addition to this topic in
English is Scholars in Exile: The Ukrainian Intellectual World in Interwar Czechoslovakia by
Nadia Zavarotna. The volume focuses on the
history of…individuals who had just lost their chance of building their own state during
the events from 1917 to 1921 in Ukraine. For them, the experience of living, studying,
and working in democratic Czechoslovakia was a positive lesson, and an impactful one.
In their host country, they carried out scholarly and educational activities that were often
remarkable.183
With this excerpt alone, one can discern why the Hungarian minority was frustrated with the
government. There is a stark difference between how they treated the Ukrainians with how they
treated the Hungarians. This is to say that even while the Czechoslovak government feared
irredentism from their Hungarian citizens, they were far more forgiving of Ukrainian cultural
autonomy and identity.
While there are scant details about the lives of regular Ukrainian citizens in
Czechoslovakia at this time, there is a wealth of information concerning the intellectual
Ukrainian minority in Zavorotna’s book. There are works on Ukrainian history as well; however,
their focus is not on those living in Czechoslovakia but rather, Ukrainian history as a whole. A
perfect example of this is Paul Kubicek’s The History of Ukraine in which he explores Ukrainian
history beginning with the pre-Slavic era through 2007. While this is a particularly important
work for Eastern European history as a whole, there is little on Czechoslovakia in the volume.
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Another historian, Vic Satzewich, focuses on the relationship between Ukrainians in North
America and their ancestral homeland in his book The Ukrainian Diaspora. He deals with the
“second wave of migration, which occurred between the wars. In particular [he] asks why
Ukrainians left their homelands during those years, and it traces the impact of World War I and
the Russian Revolution on the way that group boundaries were formed within the Ukrainian
diaspora.”184 In the aftermath of WWI, there were disagreements among Ukrainians and powers
in Eastern Europe about how those lands should be split up. The Czechoslovak government
related to those Ukrainians that yearned for an independent state and thus supported the
Ukrainian immigrants that came across their borders.
After WWI, Czechoslovakia was faced with finding a balance between the various
nationalities in the fledgling country. When the war ended, the majority of the Ukrainian lands
found themselves under Soviet rule (called the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic185), while the
rest were divided among Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.186 The carving out of the
boundaries of the First Republic, plus the migration of Ukrainian immigrants, created the
Ukrainian population in Czechoslovakia. It is also important to point out the fact that the Allies
did support an independent Ukraine and “still hoped for a single Russia under an anti-Bolshevik
government.”187 The Czechoslovak government created a space within their nation for the
immigrant Ukrainians who wanted to show the world they were also capable of being
independent and provided the means for them to receive advance education. As has been
previously pointed out, this region of Europe was (and remains) rich in diverse ethnicities,
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languages, and religions, and Wilson had to admit during the Peace Conference that when he
“gave utterance to [national self-determination]…[he] said them without the knowledge that
nationalities existed.”188 Being from the United States gave Wilson a very different
understanding of nationalities than Europeans. In America, part of the categorization of different
people was done by skin color. In Europe, it was done by nation of origin. He really had no way
of knowing that the nationalism within Eastern Europe was so deeply rooted in linguistic and
historical ties and that the number of new nations would be as large as it was. According to
Satzewich, with “the Bolshevik consolidation of control over eastern Ukraine…emigration to the
west was frowned upon, and indeed prohibited by the Soviet authorities partly because they
feared that the very existence of emigrants would send the wrong message about life in the
emergent workers’ paradise.”189 Just as the Czechoslovak Republic wanted to present a
democratic face to Europe, the Soviets wanted to show the world that their people were happy;
an exodus of their populace threatened that façade.
In the mid-1920s, many Ukrainian soldiers moved to Czechoslovakia in an effort to get
away from Soviet-controlled Ukraine, and upon arrival, they “articulate[d] a social democratic
critique of Soviet Ukraine.”190 At this time, there were at least fifty different Ukrainian
organizations in Czechoslovakia, and a large part of the population in these organizations
consisted of émigré students who had moved to Prague. By the end of the 1920s, the Czechs
were resigned to Galicia remaining part of Poland and pulled the funding for Ukrainian
organizations that wanted an independent Ukrainian state, and most of them dissolved. One of
the few groups to survive was the Group of Ukrainian National Youth (Hrupa Ukrains’koi
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National’noi Molodi - HUNM). This group was created in 1922 with the “aim of establishing an
independent Ukrainian state in Galicia.” The loss of financial support caused the dissolution of
many of the Ukrainian groups, and the HUNM attempted to align themselves with several other
organizations; they ended up founding the Union of Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists with
the League of Ukrainian Nationalists.191
The Czechoslovak government created an assistance program for émigrés in order to
“rescue existing intellectuals and professionals and prepare them for future work…[and] lent
great credibility to the Czechoslovak government in the eyes of all Europeans.”192 This
government program had three main objectives: establish housing, provide medical services, and
give young people the opportunity to finish their education. Applicants were not discriminated
against based on nationality, religion, or political affiliation. The government divided émigrés
into three groups: intellectuals, individuals who performed physical work, and the elderly,
school-age children, and people who otherwise could not perform intellectual or physical
work.193 Slavic unity was a major reason the Czechoslovak government set up the émigré
program. Pan-Slavism had existed since before World War I and was almost a mirror of PanGermanism (minus the stipulation that everyone had to speak the same language). An underlying
reason for the émigré program was to shine a light on the fledgling democracy and to align
themselves with the ideals of Western Europe.
President Masaryk looked to Western Europe as inspiration for government programs and
the first prime minister Karel Kramář looked to Russia. Thus, the two disagreed on the reason for
setting up the program, but their disagreement still had an impact on it. Kramář was a Russophile
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and saw this program as an opportunity for the new country to prove itself to Russia, while
Masaryk saw it as an opportunity “to create a positive international image of Czechoslovakia as a
liberal and democratic country.” The Czechoslovak government again showed that they were
less concerned with domestic policy ensuring the equality ostensibly guaranteed in the
Constitution and more concerned with their image on the world stage. Even after his time as the
prime minister, Kramář held indirect influence over his National Democratic Party, the goal of
which was “that ‘[the] republic would [not] be socialistic.’”194 Before the war, Kramář was a
supporter of Russia – in his mind, the “greatest of Slav States, and [he had] a keen sympathy for
Russian traditions.”195 After the Bolshevik Revolution, Kramář felt that an independent Czech
state “seemed hardly worth having, if Russia were to go down in chaos” and was angry at the
other major powers in Europe for being “glad to see [Russia] unrepresented that they might the
more easily settle their own affairs” at the Peace Conference.196 Masaryk expressed a more
“statesmanlike realism” of prewar Russia wherein he believed that “Bohemia could only hope
for a separate existence if she had a strong and regenerated Russia upon which she could
lean.”197
In the education sector, Masaryk “believed it was necessary for Slavonic peoples to study
one another and wanted to make Prague the Slavonic academic and cultural center of Europe.”198
The Institute of Slavic Studies was approved in 1922 and founded in 1928, thus fulfilling
Masaryk’s dream.199 Masaryk’s belief was that official policy and “émigré groups in
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Czechoslovakia – including the Ukrainians – benefitted from it.”200 The Ukrainian Free
University in Prague had originally begun in Vienna but moved to Prague by 1922. At first, there
was some opposition, especially from some Russophile circles, but numerous discussions
lowered the resistance.201 It seems very ironic, though not all that surprising, that the Czech
government was so willing to offer educational resources to one of their smallest minorities and
yet they barred the Hungarians from learning in their own language based on their past affiliation
with Austria-Hungary. The Ukrainians were coming into the Czechoslovak Republic and
contributing to the democratic image that the government wanted to show the world, while the
Hungarians felt as though they had been forced into a minority status and many wanted to return
to their mother country.
In addition to the free university in Prague, the Ukrainian Economic Academy was set up
in Poděbrady. This academy was built thanks to the Ukrainian Civic Committee, which played
an important role in distributing government funds to Ukrainians. Along with the academy, the
committee also established the Ukrainian Higher Pedagogical Institute, the Ukrainian
Sociological Institute, the Ukrainian Civic Publishing Fund, and the Ukrainian National Museum
and Archive. The goal of the academy (and all the rest) was to provide help to Ukrainian scholars
and to also help “prepare young Ukrainian intellectuals enter the technical and economic
sectors.”202
The Czechoslovak government provided many opportunities for Ukrainian intellectuals
that settled in Prague. The goal of these Ukrainians was to spread awareness of Ukraine to the
West and the rest of the world. Until this time, Russia was one of the few European countries
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with any interest in Ukraine. The Ukrainians, much like the Czechs and Slovaks during the First
World War, were inspired by the philosophy of national self-determination and wanted to use the
programs offered at the different academies to study Ukrainian literature and to learn the skills
needed to form their own nation. According to Zavorotna,
Ukrainian life had been largely suppressed in the Ukrainian lands: Soviet Ukraine,
Polish-ruled Galicia, and Romanian-ruled Bukovyna. After the failed attempt to found an
independent state, many émigrés in Czechoslovakia devoted themselves entirely to
scholarly work and to educating the younger generation.203
The Czechoslovak government offered many opportunities to the Ukrainian population. The
Czechoslovaks likely saw commonalities between themselves and their Ukrainian counterparts;
both were trying to build up their nations and spread information about their cultures to the rest
of Europe and the world. Even though they saw themselves as similar to the Ukrainians in their
fight for an independent nation, but refused to see those same similarities in the Germans or
Hungarians because of their bitter pasts. Payback for the oppression they faced under AustriaHungary led to the oppression of some, but not all, of the minorities within the First Republic.
Compared to the Ukrainian population, the Jewish population was well-known in Europe.
This population was unique compared to the rest because being Jewish was not only one’s
religion but was also their nationality. Unlike other minority groups, the Jewish nationality was
not determined by language, and the population ended up separated into three groups: German
Jews, Czechoslovak Jews, and Zionists.204 According to T.V. Pikovska, “Jewish selfidentification had two options – national and religious, which influenced the commitment of the
Jewish population to certain political forces.”205 In 1924, there were 354,000 Jewish people in
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Czechoslovakia, but only 53% of the overall Jewish population “acknowledge[d] themselves as
Jewish, while 21% registered as Czechoslovaks and 14% as Germans.”206 President Masaryk’s
defense of the Jewish people in Czechoslovakia helped build a “fairly loyal” relationship.
Masaryk particularly “characterized Zionism as a ‘national liberation movement of great moral
importance.”207 Although Masaryk admired and protected the Jewish citizens of the Republic,
there were those opposed to this protection within the general population. Most of the opposition
were part of the German nationality.
Coming from the Germans in October the same year, the Senate of the German
University in Prague issued instructions that the Academic Council of the university would
consist only of German members, implying that one could not be both German and Jewish. This
division represented a conflict within the Jewish population: they often felt as though they had to
choose between two possible identities instead of being both at the same time. In response, Dr.
Ludwig Singer called on the Minister of Education, stating that this instruction was a “violation
of the constitutional guarantee of the principle of equality of all citizens” and the Minister agreed
to investigate.208 Dr. Singer was a very prominent Jewish representative and led the Prague
Jewish National Council after it was formed in 1918 until his death in 1931. The Council sought
to “legitimize their self-proclaimed position as the natural representatives of the country’s
Jews.”209 He was also integral in the negotiations for the Jewish population when the Republic
was formed. In addition to council president, “he was also president of the Jewish Welfare
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Federation, a member of the Prague City Council and president of the Prague Jewish
Community.”210
When the Jewish National Council was formed, it “declared a favorable attitude towards
the Czechoslovak state and stressed the need to unite the entire Jewish population on a national
basis.” In January the following year, it convened a congress of the “national Jews in the
Czechoslovak Republic” at which they wanted to create a national organization that would
represent Czechoslovak Jews. Two months later, the People’s Union of Jews of Slovakia was
established in Bratislava. This organization was “essentially the Slovak representation of the
Prague Jewish Council.”211 The purpose of this group was to represent the population that were
of Slovak and Jewish nationality. Even though one could claim Jewish as their nationality, that
was not the only thing that people identified as, and so those of Slovak-Jewish descent felt they
needed representation in Slovakia the way that Czech-Jews were represented in Prague. Along
with the Prague Jewish National Council, there were several other parties within the state. The
largest of these was the United Jewish Party, the roots of which were Zionist. The United Jewish
Party’s intention was to focus “exclusively on the rights and interests of the Jewish minority”
and was formed from both the Prague Jewish National Council and the Union of Jews of
Slovakia, along with several other, smaller Jewish political parties.212
Even with the support of the president, the Jewish population faced anti-Semitic hostility
both before and during the First Republic. Martin Pekar states that when Austria-Hungary fell,
the Jewish population in Slovakia faced pillaging and violence, as they were associated with the
Magyarization that Hungary had forced upon the Slovaks. Pekar goes on to state that “in
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particular, the Slovak People’s Party…in the Party press and public gatherings repeatedly
criticized the ties to the Hungarian culture and the preference for using the Hungarian language,
the criticism having often passed into threats.”213 While anti-Semitism was prevalent in
Czechoslovakia, the Jewish people in the First Republic also endured anti-Hungarian prejudice.
In 1926, according to the Jewish Daily Bulletin, it was announced by Dr. Eduard Beneš
(misnamed Alfred in the article, the Minister of Foreign Affairs) that there had been
“irregularities committed by government officials during the last elections” and as a result “the
number of Jewish representatives in the Czechoslovakian Parliament was diminished.” He
further announced that the “Czechoslovakian government never fails to show favorable attitude
toward Zionism in the country and in the international arena” and that outside of this incident,
“there [was] no Jewish Question in Czechoslovakia [as] the Jews [were] even recognized as a
separate nationality.”214 Here, Beneš attempted to smooth over tension between Jewish
representatives and members of the government who did not want them to be there. Even though
Beneš may have believed that the Czechoslovak government had the best interests of the Jewish
population in mind, and that official national policy lent full support to the Jewish population,
that did not stop anti-Semitic beliefs from existing. There were members of the government who
actively played a role in lowering the number of Jewish representatives in Parliament, and Beneš
glossed over this by stating that the Jewish population had the support of the government.
On August 8,1926, the government announced an ordinance that pertained to the Jewish
population in Carpathian Ruthenia, asserting that Jewish families could gain citizenship even if
they were not part of the older families in these lands. The ordinance allowed for “Jewish war
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invalids to obtain pensions from the Czechoslovakian government.”215 However, even with the
path to citizenship open for the Jewish population, this did not mean they were always welcome
in the wider public. The Jewish Daily Bulletin reported on September 1, 1926, that “several
scores of Jewish families in the city of Jassina, Czechoslovakia, [were] threatened with expulsion
from the country” due to Czech officials refusing to “recognize the citizenship of the Jewish
residents, although they had been resident in the city for fifty years and their sons had served in
the Czechoslovak army.”216 It was a double-standard: even though the Jewish veterans had
fought for Austria-Hungary, they still were supposed to be protected by the Minorities Treaty,
and these Czech officials were blatantly breaking it.
In the educational sector, there was anti-Semitic rhetoric as well. In October 1926,
Professor Theodor Lessing, who was a “noted philosopher and pacifist” and a professor at
Hanover Technical College in Germany, was “invited by the Zionist Organization of
Czechoslovakia to make a lecture tour [there].” However, when he arrived and was about to
speak at Brno, “German students interrupted the meeting, throwing gas bombs into the
audience.”217 In 1933, Professor Lessing was shot to death in Marienbad (now Mariánske Lazne)
while he was sleeping. He was regarded as “one of the bitterest foes of the Nazi regime and the
man most thoroughly hated by Nazi leaders.” He had received death threats previously and it
“was a current belief that a substantial price had been set on the famous philosopher’s head.”218
After his assassination, the perpetrators (Rudolf Eckert and Franz Zischka) fled to Germany and
the Czech government in Prague requested an extradition of the two men. However, in the Nazi
press, they were celebrated as heroes and there was much doubt that Germany would cooperate
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in their apprehension. Even though the Czechoslovak authorities knew who the assassins were,
they received no help from Nazi Germany, and it was not until 1945 that one of them, Rudolf
Eckert, was brought in for questioning in reference to Lessing’s murder.219 The Jewish
population faced many issues within the First Republic. These pale in comparison to the horror
they faced during the Second World War, but that does not detract from their fight for rights in
the twenty-year life of The First Czechoslovak Republic.
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Conclusion: Historical Implications

The promise of the post-World War I era was, for the First Czechoslovak Republic, the
opportunity to create a democracy that could successfully unite and govern a disparate
population. While the new government hoped to project this image to the world, in reality each
of the national minority populations within the First Czechoslovak Republic came with its own
set of issues and grievances with the government. Some resented what they perceived as a
demotion to minority status when they had very recently been favored by the elite, while others
were elevated and praised for their hard work and almost pitied for their bad luck. A running
theme for the minorities within this nation was the quest for national self-determination.
Wilson’s philosophy gave them a sense of hope for a future defined by self-determination and
increased rights within new nation-states. Yet in practice, the government created uneven
policies that simultaneously restricted the Hungarian minority, while the Ukrainians were
celebrated and given the opportunity to study their culture without fear of arrest. The
Czechoslovak government supported the Jewish population, while Germans fought against the
Jewish population’s rights. The self determination that in many ways fueled the creation of the
First Czechoslovak Republic, was also a weapon against it from those minorities, like the
Germans and Slovaks, who viewed the new state as even more oppressive than the AustroHungarian Empire.
Much of what the Czechoslovak government was concerned with during the first iteration
of the Republic was the image they sent to the world. The Czechs, in particular, were eager to
show the Allies just how democratic and free they could be, now that they were free of the
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Austro-Hungarian Empire. Part of this desire to impress the allies was to protect the new nationstate from foreign governments interested in reclaiming land. Although they wanted to present a
perfect image of democracy in a politically divided Europe, they failed to completely include all
nationalities within the state. The Czechoslovak government took on the enormous task of
attempting to decolonize their land and people from the previous imperialist rule and struggled to
govern those thrust under their control. Indeed, several of the minorities felt as though they had
been forced into their minority positions and resented the Czechoslovak government. All
minority issues within the First Republic had roots in their historical relationships with each
other. Unfortunately, the First Republic did not last long enough to solve any of their minority
questions due to the loss of land in 1938 with the Munich Crisis and World War II.
The Czech-Slovak relationship in the First Republic was affected by the separation of the
two lands under the Dual Monarchy. While neither was favored under Austro-Hungarian rule,
but the Slovaks suffered relatively more oppression than their Czech counterparts. The more
conservative Slovak population was unhappy with the majority Czech government of the First
Republic because of what the Slovaks believed was a progressive attitude and disdain for
Catholicism. This led to the Slovak fight for national self-determination. Both people had
experienced colonization by outside foreign rulers, but the Slovaks wanted to be their own
nation-state separate from an alliance with the Czechs.
Historical difficulties also drove the problems between the Czechs and Germans. The
complete switch from crown favorites to a minority population with far less power than they
were used to, along with the feeling of separation from their homeland, contributed to the
tensions between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs. The tensions then translated to an
increase in Nazism in the Sudetenland leading up to the Second World War. The Germans in
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Czechoslovakia were ready to reunite with their home country, so supported Hitler when he took
the Sudetenland in 1938. Like the Slovaks, the Germans used national self-determination to fight
for their right to be unified with Germany.
Similar to the Germans, the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia felt as though they had been
thrust into a minority position by outside forces. Their position in these lands fell when the Dual
Monarchy did and they resented their new one. The Magyarization of the Slovak population
prior to the War put a bad taste in the Slovaks’ mouths and they were determined to do what they
could to reverse it. However, in the Czechoslovak endeavor to end Magyarization and support
the Slovak right to learn and celebrate who they were, the Hungarians lost governmental
encouragement to pursue their own national self-determination.
Unlike the Hungarian population, the Ukrainians within the First Republic were
practically celebrated. Indeed, the Czech government saw similarities between themselves and
the Ukrainian population and welcomed emigrants from Soviet Ukraine. The Czechoslovak
government even set up an assistance program for those émigrés that helped establish housing,
medical services, and education. Of course, this was not done strictly out of the goodness of the
Czechoslovaks’ hearts; the program also offered the opportunity for Czechoslovakia to prove
itself as a country that had the same ideals as Western Europe.
Finally, the Jewish population was supported by the Czech government, particularly
Thomas Masaryk, but the Germans within the government and other sectors of the state were
against any Jewish power, even the power to claim a nationality outside their religion. The
Jewish population’s previous relationship to Hungary and Magyarization contributed to issues
between them and the Slovak population as well. Not to mention that centuries of anti-Semitism
could not have been expected to fade solely because of the support of the Czech government.
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The power of democracy was not enough to quell the rise of Nazism leading up to the Second
World War.
Interwar interaction between Central-Eastern European countries also contributed to
many of the tensions between the Czechoslovak government of the First Republic and the rest of
the population. Several of the minority populations felt like outsiders in the fledgling nation
because of the lines drawn at the Paris Peace Conference. They were just in the wrong place at
the wrong time, got separated from their homeland, and placed in a position where they felt as
though their government was working against them. The states surrounding the First Republic
also worked to regain their territory after the War and Germany was even successful in the
cession of previously held territory in 1938. Hitler was able to capitalize on the German
population’s anger at their demotion, and even though the Czechoslovak government worked
tirelessly to prove that they had the ideals of Western Europe, they were never truly seen by the
West.
The Allies were content with setting up a democracy in war-torn Europe, but they seemed
uninterested beyond that. In wanting to keep the peace in the 1930s, British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain and French Premier Édouard Daladier met with Hitler to negotiate the
cession of the Sudetenland without the input of Czechoslovak representatives. This proves that
the West was ready to dictate the lives of others in Central-Eastern Europe without even trying to
negotiate with them, as if they were only interested in making decisions for them rather than with
them. The twenty-year life of The First Czechoslovak Republic was met with tension and disdain
by those living within its borders, as well as outside forces influencing the lives of its citizens. It
seemed as though those surrounding the First Republic wanted to pick at its corpse before it even
died, and the West was content to help in order to avoid another war.
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The lack of Western familiarity with this part of the world was not unique to the interwar
period. There has been a continued disinterest until very recently. Many times, when one thinks
of Czechoslovakia, their mind goes to the cession of the Sudetenland in 1938 or its association
with communism. The focus on the formation of the First Republic and minority relations feeds
directly into future struggles faced by the people who lived in this area. Relations between
different nationalities within Central-Eastern Europe continue to contribute directly to interEuropean imperialism. Even now, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia has been thrust
into the global spotlight with Russia’s invasion. By studying the historical relationships between
European nationalities, one can gain better context for contemporary issues.
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